Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) exposes large language models to knowledge-poisoning attacks, where misinformation injected into retrieved documents can influence model outputs. Prior work has shown that models may detect contradictory evidence yet still allow it to influence their responses, revealing a gap between monitoring and control. We investigate whether deliberative reasoning changes this relationship. Because attack success and poison detection alone do not reveal whether detected poison continues to influence the final answer, we use two complementary measures: Cordon Rate, the probability that a model detects poison and nevertheless produces a poison-aligned answer, conditioned on a non-poison-aligned no-RAG response; and Leakage Rate, the probability that poisoned context influences the answer despite an explicit instruction to ignore retrieved documents. Across 200 SciFact questions, we compare reasoning-disabled and reasoning-enabled configurations of DeepSeek-V4-Flash and Qwen3.6-Plus. For DeepSeek-V4-Flash, reasoning reduces Cordon Rate from 0.205 to 0.075 and Leakage Rate from 0.235 to 0.140, despite increasing Attack Success Rate from 0.233 to 0.298 and decreasing Poison Detection Rate from 0.965 to 0.665. Qwen3.6-Plus shows the same qualitative pattern. These results demonstrate that poison detection and downstream influence capture distinct aspects of poisoning behavior.
Repeated passages in retrieved evidence may influence how language models identify misinformation, even when those passages restate a single underlying claim rather than provide independent support. We compare four instruction-tuned models on 200 claims from the BEIR SciFact test split using paired, fixed seven-document contexts. The minority condition contains one poisoned document and six non-target documents, whereas the majority condition contains the original poisoned document, five paraphrases, and one non-target document. Poison detection rates increase from 45.5% to 66.0% for Apertus-8B and from 4.0% to 15.5% for Aya-Expanse-8B, but decrease from 80.0% to 47.5% for Mistral-Nemo and from 25.0% to 9.5% for Gemma-3-12B-IT. All four paired comparisons are statistically significant. These contrasting results suggest that repeated poisoned evidence does not affect all models in the same way. One possible interpretation is that repetition makes the poisoned claim more conspicuous to some models, potentially facilitating its detection, while other models may treat repeated formulations as reinforcing evidence, potentially reducing their ability to identify the poisoned claim. Although these interpretations require further investigation, the findings highlight the importance of model-dependent responses to repeated evidence in retrieval-augmented settings.
Persian medical natural language processing remains limited by the scarcity of domain-specific resources and insufficient public characterization of their coverage and quality. We present Gaokerena, an openly released suite of Persian medical resources comprising an 85.5-million-word corpus of 101,954 web articles; MF3QA, a 24,000-pair patient-doctor question-answering dataset; 1,878 Iranian medical examination questions (KOPP); 1,089 manually translated medical MMLU questions (FA_MED_MMLU); and approximately 18,000 machine-translated MedMCQA training items filtered by two language-model evaluators. We characterize the resources' composition, orthographic variation, redundancy, topical coverage, privacy indicators, answer-key balance, extraction artefacts, and translation limitations. As application case studies, we adapt Aya-Expanse-8B into Gaokerena-V, trained on the corpus and MF3QA, and Gaokerena-R, developed through preference-based reasoning distillation. On translated medical MMLU, Gaokerena-V achieves 49.31% accuracy under direct prompting, compared with 46.65% for Aya-Expanse-8B; the paired exact McNemar test is statistically inconclusive (p = 0.0502). Gaokerena-R reaches 52.80% using five-sample self-consistency and a verifier, but this higher-compute setting is not directly comparable. Under matched five-sample chain-of-thought self-consistency without a verifier, Gaokerena-R scores 48.58%, versus 46.92% for Aya-Expanse-8B, a non-significant difference (p = 0.190). English evaluation also reveals a substantial performance gap relative to Persian. To our knowledge, Gaokerena provides the first openly released and systematically characterized suite of Persian medical resources alongside generative models built on them. These protocol-specific results do not establish an isolated training advantage or clinical readiness.