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原文摘要

Website fingerprinting attacks infer websites visited by users and threaten their privacy. These attacks are classified as on-path, which monitor network traffic, and co-located, which exploit shared system resources. Existing co-located attacks, such as sweep-counting and loop-counting, achieve over 90% accuracy but suffer significant performance degradation on many-core systems. Loop-counting accuracy drops from 93% on 8 cores to 50% on 24 cores, while sweep-counting accuracy decreases from 84% to 45% across multiple Core Complex Dies (CCDs). To address these limitations, we propose memory-chasing, a scalable website fingerprinting attack that exploits DRAM traffic interference through pointer-chasing traversals with minimal interference. By counting DRAM accesses over fixed intervals, the attack generates distinctive traces for website classification. Evaluated on the top 50 websites, memory-chasing achieves 96% accuracy on a 24-core system, 86% across multiple CCDs, 80% across multiple sockets, and 97% in an open-world setting. Extensive evaluation across hardware configurations, browsers, operating systems, isolation mechanisms, system noise, and countermeasures demonstrates its robustness and scalability.