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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2602.15198

Colosseum: Auditing Collusion in Cooperative Multi-Agent Systems

Mason Nakamura, Abhinav Kumar, Saswat Das, Sahar Abdelnabi, Saaduddin Mahmud, Ferdinando Fioretto, Shlomo Zilberstein, Eugene Bagdasarian

原文摘要

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when a group of agents forms a coalition and colludes to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a formal multi-agent decision-making framework and measure action-based collusive behavior in actions via regret relative to the cooperative optimum and compare it with communication-based collusive behavior. Colosseum enables audits of LLM agents for collusion under benign settings, different coalition objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. We then introduce a new behavioral probe by creating secret communication channels between agents, showing that most out-of-the-box models exhibit a propensity to collude under this probe, which we term emergent collusion. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but often pick non-collusive actions. Colosseum provides a new way to audit collusion in cooperative multi-agent systems while presenting observations about how collusion emerges, what affects collusion efficacy, and which strategies may mitigate it.

cs.MA · cs.AI · cs.CL

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2609.35596

SEABench: Benchmarking Endogenous Misalignment In Self-Evolving Agents

Saswat Das, Parvati Viswanathan, Daniel Donnelly, Chang Huang, Sahar Abdelnabi, Ferdinando Fioretto

原文摘要

Self-evolving LLM agents have gained prominence for their ability to improve after deployment by modifying their harness, including their controller instructions, memory management protocols, and reusable tools and skills, in response to user and environment feedback. However, locally useful updates may persist into later tasks where they produce unsafe behavior, even without direct adversarial influence. To study this risk, we introduce SEABench, a benchmark for studying endogenous misalignment arising from agent self-evolution, with 48 longitudinal task sequences that span multiple evolution surfaces, task domains, and harm types in a rich personal-assistant environment. To account for the stochasticity inherent in agentic operations, we provide an adaptive trajectory discovery pipeline that probes for failures while preserving original task intent and supports causal attribution through paired non-evolving agents and attribution scores. Our evaluation across multiple recent LLMs, evolution surfaces, and harm types reveals that self-evolution indeed increases task completion rates but often at the cost of safety failures that are absent for paired non-evolving baseline agents. We also show that qualitatively different safety behaviors emerge across evolution surfaces and harm types. Further, we show that this divergence in safety behavior is reflected in agents' chain-of-thought reasoning, which yields an effective monitoring strategy that can mitigate unsafe behavior with a low false positive rate.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.CL