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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-22 08:44 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-21 12:19各信源进度 →

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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.25821

Signed but Unbound: The Authority Gap Between Agent Commerce Mandates and Crypto Wallet Signatures

Shengwei You, Aditya Joshi, Andrey Kuehlkamp, Jarek Nabrzyski

原文摘要

When an artificial intelligence agent pays with a stablecoin, the commerce protocol can specify the merchant, order, amount, and facilitator. The token contract enforces the fields the wallet signs. We call the difference the authority gap, define nine constraint classes, and derive them for 12 authorization configurations, including Coinbase's deployed Commerce Payments Protocol. All 31,800 trials on local copies of deployed contract code match the derivation. A controlled comparison shows that committing the terms in the signed nonce binds the order. When the facilitator submits a payment to a merchant account without code, binding the facilitator requires a separate recipient contract. Of 26,653 sampled USD Coin authorizations redeemed on Base, 98.7% followed a path that any holder of the signature could redeem. We prove sufficient conditions for a recipient contract to enforce the signed mandate under a trusted signer and show which recipient a wallet displays. MandateLock, a minimal implementation for immediate payments, rejects all 10,800 modified mandates on deployed token code and accepts signatures from two independent signers. It uses 25% more gas than a transfer that only the recipient can submit.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.24989

Signed, Valid, and Unauthorized: Authority Closure at the Trust Boundary Between Agent Commerce Protocols and Crypto Wallets

Shengwei You, Aditya Joshi, Andrey Kuehlkamp, Jarek Nabrzyski

原文摘要

Agent commerce protocols let software agents pay with stablecoins. A buyer approves a payee, asset, spending cap and time window, but the wallet signs an object whose effects depend on the contracts that consume it. Matching the displayed fields or simulating one payment can miss transfers that the signed object still permits. We define authority closure as the set of transfer sequences that holding the signed object can enable. A wallet object respects the mandate when every such sequence meets the buyer's constraints. We characterize when wallet objects can satisfy this property and implement Closure, a wallet-side checker covering 13 families of signed objects. In an evaluation of 2,130 generated objects and 62,979 execution programs, 265 objects with an observed violation passed both a field-and-expiry check and an address allow-list. Under the test model, Closure rejected all 1,680 objects with an observed violation and accepted the remaining 450. In two local checkouts using the x402 reference client, approved payments settled and Closure refused requests outside the mandate before signing. The median decision time was at most 12 microseconds per family.

cs.CR