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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2602.20429

匿名信息下的稳健机制设计

Robust Mechanism Design with Anonymous Information

Zhihao Gavin Tang, Shixin Wang

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研究卖家仅观测到竞拍者估值的一个匿名次序统计量分布时,在与之相容的所有乘积分布上最大化最坏情况期望收益的稳健拍卖设计。

econ.TH · cs.GT

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In practice, auction data are often endogenously censored and anonymous, revealing only limited outcome statistics rather than full bid profiles. We study robust auction design when the seller observes only the distribution of a single anonymous order statistic of the bidders' values and seeks to maximize worst-case expected revenue over all product distributions consistent with the observed statistic. We show that simple and widely used mechanisms are robustly optimal. Specifically, posted pricing is robustly optimal given the distribution of the highest value; the Myerson auction designed for the unique consistent i.i.d. distribution, with uniformly random tie-breaking, is robustly optimal given the lowest value distribution; and the second-price auction with an optimal reserve is robustly optimal when an intermediate order statistic is observed and the implied i.i.d. distribution is regular above its reserve. Without any regularity assumption, when the second-highest value is observed, the best worst-case revenue of a second-price auction with a reserve is still at least a $2-\sqrt{2}\approx 0.586$ fraction of the optimal worst-case revenue. More generally, for a broad class of monotone symmetric mechanisms depending only on the top $k$ order statistics, including multi-unit and position auctions, the worst-case revenue is attained under the i.i.d. distribution consistent with the observed $k$-th order statistic. Our results provide a tractable foundation for non-discriminatory auction design, where fairness and privacy are intrinsic consequences of the information structure rather than imposed constraints.