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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.21533

Incentive Alignment for Electricity Data Assets in China: A Blockchain-Enabled Contribution-Credit Framework

Jiazheng Zhang, Shouwei Li, Yutian Deng, Wei Wei, John Cartlidge

原文摘要

Modern electricity markets increasingly rely on reported operational contributions to allocate incentives, recognise cooperation, and coordinate activities across multiple organisations. However, supporting evidence for many reported contributions becomes available only after subsequent metering, dispatch, settlement, or auditing processes, making it difficult to reward genuine contributions while discouraging strategic over-reporting. Existing approaches largely address data sharing, performance verification, blockchain record management, or incentive allocation in isolation, providing limited support for integrating delayed evidence into a unified incentive mechanism. This paper proposes a blockchain-enabled contribution-credit framework for truthful reporting under delayed evidence. The framework links authenticated evidence to contribution recognition through dynamic credit updating, escrow, report-linked penalties, and automated incentive execution. Developed using the Chinese electricity market as the primary setting, it is demonstrated through two representative coordination scenarios, with adaptations illustrating its applicability to UK and US electricity-market structures. A controlled heterogeneous-agent simulation evaluates the behavioural effects of the proposed mechanism, while security analysis, public-data workflow analysis, and blockchain implementation experiments assess its practical feasibility. The results show that integrating delayed evidence with dynamic credit, escrow, and report-linked penalties promotes truthful reporting while providing a transparent and auditable process for translating verified operational contributions into incentive allocation. The proposed framework offers a practical mechanism for improving accountability, coordination, and incentive compatibility in collaborative electricity markets.

cs.CY · cs.DC