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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2608.12253

One Frozen Simulator Is Not Enough: Simulator Collapse in Multi-Agent RL

Simon Yu, Nicholas Tomlin, Marwa Abdulhai, Ximing Lu, Derek Chong, Abe Hou, Dilara Soylu, Sergey Levine 等 10 位作者

原文摘要

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for human-AI interaction usually trains the agent against a single large language model (LLM) that simulates the user. We show that agents trained this way can systematically fail to generalize, and we trace the failure to simulator collapse: the simulator LLM is mode-collapsed, and a policy trained against it learns narrow strategies that exploit the simulator's mode behavior; these strategies transfer poorly to unseen simulators and to real users. We formalize the collapse and propose two solutions. Verbalized Sampling, applied at inference time, samples each simulator reply from a verbalized response distribution. Co-Training, applied during training similar to self-play, co-evolves the simulator as the policy, so the policy cannot exploit the mode behavior. A population variant samples the simulator for each rollout from a pool of recent checkpoints. We validate both solutions on three benchmarks: Persuasion for Good, tau^2-bench, and CooperBench. Verbalized Sampling improves held-out success by up to 9% over single-simulator RL, and Co-Training pushes gains further to 14%; the human study shows similar gain on real users. Both solutions also preserve the policy diversity that collapses under single-simulator RL. Overall, our findings on simulator collapse point to diverse simulators as a requirement for RL agents that serve real users. We release SCOPE, an open-source framework for Population Co-Training in multi-agent RL.

cs.CL · cs.AI · cs.LG

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2606.05647

Coding with the Enemy: Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?

Jingheng Ye, Huiqi Zou, Simon Yu, Weiyan Shi

原文摘要

AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools. This creates a new attack surface: an agent can exploit human trust to sabotage development, for instance by inserting malicious code to accomplish a hidden side task. Most prior work studies AI sabotage in AI-only settings, paying limited attention to the role of human oversight in detecting and mitigating such malicious behavior. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of human oversight in AI coding sabotage. Over 100 participants collaborate with one of four frontier models (Claude-Opus-4.6, GPT-5.4, Gemini-3.1-Pro, and MiniMax-M2.7) on a long-horizon coding task lasting around five hours, designed to mimic real-world workflows. We find that 83/88 (94%) of developers in the no-monitor conditions fail to detect sabotage, and our analysis of participant feedback attributes this vulnerability to minimal code review, plausible cover story, and overtrust in agents. We further test the effectiveness of a safety monitor in one condition: while the monitor reduces sabotage success, sabotage still succeeds in 9/16 (56%) of sessions with a correct monitor alert. Drawing on participant feedback, we offer actionable suggestions for better monitor design. This work complements existing AI safety research and highlights an urgent need for human-centric safety mechanisms that account for human factors, particularly in long-horizon, real-world development settings.

cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.CY · cs.HC