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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.22403

BehaVerify: A Formal Verification Tool for Behavior Trees

Serena S. Serbinowska, Ben Wooding, Diego Manzanas Lopez, Luke Nam, Anne M. Tumlin, Nicholas K. Potteiger, Hongchao Zhang, Taylor T. Johnson

原文摘要

This paper presents BehaVerify, a verification toolbox for behavior trees (BTs) and Neuro-Symbolic BTs. BTs are a graphical language for planning and sequencing behaviors - similar to extended state machines - and are increasingly used in safety-critical domains. BehaVerify enables users to specify a BT using a Domain Specific Language (DSL) with formal syntax and semantics. This language further includes Linear Temporal Logic and Computation Tree Logic specifications. BehaVerify uses an efficient encoding into nuXmv, called fastforwarding, to quickly verify if a specification holds over the BT. Additionally, BehaVerify can generate implementations of the BT in Python and Haskell. Through Python, BehaVerify has been integrated with PyTrees and Robot Operating System (ROS) and has been deployed to several autonomous robotic systems, including for verifying runtime monitors. While prior works have developed the underlying theory, this manuscript focuses on the toolbox usage, functionality and implementation. BehaVerify is open source: https://github.com/verivital/behaverify

cs.SE · cs.LO · cs.RO

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.06802

ConDR:通过神经 Hamilton-Jacobi 次解实现保守可达性

ConDR: Conservative Reachability through Neural Hamilton-Jacobi Subsolutions

Kendra Givens, Taylor T. Johnson, Bryan C. Ward, Thomas Beckers

AI 速读 基于摘要

提出保守版 DeepReach(ConDR),通过单边损失学习 HJI 变分不等式的次解,使学到的不可达安全集包含真实不安全集,从而减少不安全状态被误判为安全的情况。

cs.RO · cs.LG · eess.SY

查看原文摘要

Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) Reachability identifies the unsafe states of a dynamical system from which it can be forced into failure under worst-case disturbance. However, classical grid-based solvers scale exponentially with state dimension. DeepReach improves scalability by replacing the grid with a neural value function trained on the HJ-Isaacs (HJI) variational inequality (VI), but penalizes both sides of the residual equally. This allows the learned value to lie above the true one and unsafe states to be misclassified as safe. We propose Conservative DeepReach (ConDR) which aims to learn a subsolution of the HJI VI such that the learned unsafe set contains the true one. ConDR enforces the obstacle branch and terminal condition by construction, pushes the HJI residual to a safety margin $ε$ below zero with a one-sided loss, and prevents the degenerate solution of classifying everything as unsafe. We prove that the exact solution of the margin-shifted VI that ConDR trains toward is a subsolution of the original VI so its unsafe set contains the true one and its value lies within $ετ$ of the true value function. We compare against DeepReach and MADR in the established systems of Air3D, Air6D, a 9D multi-vehicle system, and a 13D quadrotor. ConDR reports the lowest rate of unsafe state misclassified and the lowest closed-loop collision rates with at most a small increase in intervention. On Air3D and Air6D, ConDR tolerates model mismatch that scales with $ε$. At matched false-negative rates, ConDR's unsafe sets are smaller than the baselines showing the safety is not obtained by trivial over-approximation.

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.39547

Assuring Learning-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems with Foundation Models: A Neuro-Symbolic Agenda for Testing, Verification, and Runtime Assurance

Xi Zheng, Ivan Ruchkin, Hong Jin Kang, Tevfik Bultan, Vijay Ganesh, Taylor T. Johnson, Ziyang Li, Lei Ma 等 14 位作者

原文摘要

Learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPS), including autonomous vehicles and UAVs, increasingly incorporate foundation models, yet fragmented assurance practices provide insufficient support for system-level guarantees. We argue that restoring engineering control across stochastic neural, symbolic, and physical boundaries requires a shift from model-centric evaluation to system-level assurance. We introduce the Foundation Model Assurance Stack, connecting three directions: (i) neuro-symbolic architectures that constrain foundation models through explicit symbolic world models, reasoning layers, and interfaces; (ii) semantically grounded, conformance-based testing that combines formal specifications and symbolic world models with foundation-model-assisted specification mining, scenario generation, and test synthesis; and (iii) compositional verification and runtime assurance that target formally tractable components and interfaces through modular contracts, equivalence checking, verified synthesis, uncertainty-aware reasoning, and runtime monitoring and enforcement. Symbolic abstractions establish assurance boundaries between stochastic learning and formal reasoning, connecting testing, verification, and runtime evidence across the system lifecycle. Foundation models serve as constrained assistants whose outputs are independently checked wherever correctness can be formally specified. We identify research challenges in specification engineering, abstraction fidelity, evidence composition, and lifecycle certification, and outline a staged agenda toward trustworthy, deployable, and certifiable learning-enabled CPS.

cs.RO · eess.SY