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版本更新 · v3arXiv:2610.28141

Fixed Sets and the Hardness of Computing Correlated Equilibria

Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm, Brian Hu Zhang

原文摘要

We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. From a conceptual standpoint, we connect correlated equilibria to a natural generalization of fixed points, which we call fixed sets. A fixed set of a continuous function $f$ is a nonempty finite set $S$ such that $S \subseteq \operatorname{conv} f(S)$. Our main technical contribution is to prove that computing a fixed set is PPAD-hard even at inverse polynomial precision.

cs.GT · cs.CC · cs.DS · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.02521

On the Convergence of Alternating Regret Matching Algorithms

Anh Duc Nguyen, Ioannis Anagnostides, Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm

原文摘要

Alternating updates, that is, where each player is updated in turn, tend to typically perform better in regret matching algorithms than simultaneous updates. Alternation within the regret matching family has long been a central ingredient of practical solvers for zero-sum games. Yet our theoretical understanding is lagging behind. In this paper, we address this gap by developing a systematic way of analyzing such algorithms. Our framework centers on an alternating analog of the RVU property that we introduce, which we use to obtain the optimal $T^{-1}$ average-iterate convergence within this family. In particular, we establish this for two simple variants of predictive regret matching$^+$: i) increasing-regret predictive regret matching$^+$ and ii) half-prediction regret matching$^+$. Interestingly, we find that half prediction is the unique prediction multiplier that satisfies our alternating RVU property, giving it a strong theoretical justification. Going beyond average-iterate convergence, we refine our framework to obtain $T^{-1/2}$ best-iterate convergence and further establish convergence of their strategy profiles to a single Nash equilibrium, without assuming equilibrium uniqueness. We go on to establish separations between alternating and simultaneous updates, including a game in which half-prediction regret matching$^+$ converges under alternating updates but fails to converge in terms of the last iterate under simultaneous updates. This provides theoretical support for the empirical observation that alternation can stabilize learning dynamics. Finally, experiments on 15 game benchmarks demonstrate that the strong theoretical properties of the half-prediction mechanism translate to strong practical performance, being on par with state-of-the-art solvers.

cs.GT · cs.LG

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.35004

Follow the Regularized Leader Does Not Converge in Constrained Optimization

Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Nikolas Patris, Tuomas Sandholm

原文摘要

Follow the regularized leader (FTRL) is a foundational algorithm in online learning whose regret properties have been extensively studied for decades. However, in stark contrast to mirror descent---and gradient descent in particular---the convergence of FTRL to first-order stationary points in constrained nonconvex optimization was not well understood. In this paper, we show that continuous-time FTRL can fail to converge even asymptotically in infinitely smooth constrained optimization problems: its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) gap can remain bounded away from zero indefinitely. This is especially surprising in light of the fact that continuous-time FTRL guarantees a monotonic improvement of the objective value. As a result, we establish that non-convergent behavior of no-regret dynamics---which besets general variational inequality problems---can occur even in potential systems. From a technical standpoint, our construction relies on an infinitely differentiable function where the gradient flow dynamics exhibit decelerating oscillations without ever converging pointwise, which we in turn embed into higher-dimensional FTRL dynamics that sustain a perpetually large KKT gap. We complement our negative result by showing that FTRL with Euclidean regularization does converge when the objective function is analytic. This shows that the analytic property plays a more fundamental role for FTRL than for gradient flow: it governs not only pointwise convergence, but convergence to first-order stationarity itself.

cs.GT · math.OC