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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2608.27496

ROPE:面向间接提示注入的路由来源策略执行

ROPE: Routed Origin Policy Enforcement against Indirect Prompt Injection

Xinhang Ma, Chaowei Xiao, William Yeoh, Ning Zhang, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

AI 速读 基于摘要

ROPE 利用系统信任根为敏感工具参数按任务生成来源策略,并在工具执行前做确定性校验,以在抵御间接提示注入的同时尽量少损失效用。

cs.CR

查看原文摘要

Tool-using LLM agents execute consequential operations on behalf of users. Because the LLM driving an agent processes trusted user instructions and untrusted content in the same context, agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks that induce unintended actions by mixing malicious instructions into benign data. Defenses based on prompting or content detection are easily evaded by paraphrasing attacks, while system-level defenses that constrain tool calls using inferred user intent, or restrict which sources can supply values to sensitive tools, greatly compromise utility. We present ROPE (Routed Origin Policy Enforcement), a defense that greatly improves the utility-security tradeoff by leveraging system roots of trust to create and enforce per-task policies on sensitive tool parameters. Our key insight is that authentication and integrity protection provide a basis for identifying the source of content independently of instructions embedded in it. Before a task unfolds, an LLM router reads only trusted task input to set a provenance rule for each sensitive tool parameter, accounting for the nature of the task and the values and sources the user specified. As the agent works, an origin labeler records where each piece of content came from, using the user's request, platform metadata, and protected record fields as trust anchors. Before any sensitive tool executes, a deterministic verifier requires each of its origin-guarded values to match a value in a source its rule accepts. We show that ROPE provably guarantees parameter value provenance to sensitive tool calls and is immune to paraphrasing attacks. Against eleven defenses on AgentDojo and AgentDyn under static, adaptive, and long-horizon attacks, ROPE exhibits near-perfect security while compromising far less utility than the best baseline defenses. Code and data are available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/ROPE.

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2608.05430

Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text

Buzhao Liu, Xinhang Ma, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

原文摘要

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use in orchestrating workflows of tool-using agents. This, however, also exposes such agents to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, such as indirect prompt injection (IPI). One class of approaches to defend against such attacks aims to detect malicious sentences within otherwise benign text. While a number of approaches for this have been proposed, all tend to be brittle under adaptive paraphrasing attacks, in part because they do not capture sufficient global context to effectively differentiate malicious text from benign. We address this gap by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware, which we then harden against paraphrasing through two adversarial training (AT) methods: feature-space robust learning and AT with simulated LLM-based paraphrasing. Moreover, we parametrize the AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using IPI benchmarks we show that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art defense baselines under both static and adaptive paraphrasing attacks while preserving high utility. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

cs.CR · cs.LG

首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.519ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Protecting Language Models Against Unauthorized Distillation through Trace Rewriting

Xinhang Ma Washington University, Saint Louis, William Yeoh Washington University, Saint Louis, Ning Zhang Washington University, Saint Louis, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik Washington University, St. Louis

原文摘要

Knowledge distillation is a widely adopted technique for transferring capabilities from LLMs to smaller, more efficient student models.However, unauthorized use of knowledge distillation takes unfair advantage of the considerable effort and cost put into developing frontier models.We investigate methods for modifying teacher-generated reasoning traces to achieve two objectives that deter unauthorized distillation: (1) anti-distillation, or degrading the training usefulness of query responses, and (2) API watermarking, which embeds verifiable signatures in student models.We introduce several approaches for dynamically rewriting a teacher’s reasoning outputs while preserving answer correctness and semantic coherence.Two of these leverage the rewriting capabilities of LLMs, while others use gradient-based techniques.Our experiments show that a simple instruction-based rewriting approach achieves a strong anti-distillation effect while maintaining or even improving teacher performance.Furthermore, we show that our rewriting approach also enables embedding watermarks that can be reliably detectedwith essentially no false alarms.Our code is available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/trace-rewriting.

cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表