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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.19656

BadGCL: Towards Persistent Backdoor Attack on Graph Continual Learning Systems

Dong Li, Yufei Han, Xintao Wu, Xujiang Zhao, Wei Cheng, Chen Zhao

原文摘要

Backdoor attacks pose a persistent security threat to machine learning systems, yet their behavior under graph continual learning (GCL) remains underexplored. Conventional graph backdoor attacks often lose effectiveness as models are updated across successive tasks, creating the impression that continual updates naturally weaken malicious associations. This work reveals a contrasting vulnerability: knowledge-preservation mechanisms in GCL can also preserve early injected backdoors when the poisoned update is compatible with the clean-task signal being retained. For graph data, this risk is amplified by structural triggers, which are embedded into the message-passing paths of graph neural networks (GNNs) and can induce stable representation shifts across tasks. To expose this risk, we propose BadGCL, a model-agnostic framework for persistent backdoor attacks under a strict early-stage intervention setting. BadGCL learns topology-aware structural triggers using a gradient mutual-information objective that couples poisoned gradients with clean-task optimization signals, together with a propagation consistency objective that stabilizes trigger-induced effects through graph message passing. We provide theoretical analysis showing that gradient compatibility and propagation stability jointly support long-term backdoor persistence under benign continual updates. Extensive experiments across task-IL and class-IL protocols, four GCL benchmarks, and diverse victim systems show that BadGCL achieves persistent attack effectiveness with limited clean-utility degradation, substantially outperforming graph and continual-learning backdoor baselines and remaining robust against representative defenses.

cs.LG · cs.AI

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2603.10801

PolGS++: Physically-Guided Polarimetric Gaussian Splatting for Fast Reflective Surface Reconstruction

Yufei Han, Chu Zhou, Youwei Lyu, Qi Chen, Si Li, Boxin Shi, Yunpeng Jia, Heng Guo 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Accurate reconstruction of reflective surfaces remains a fundamental challenge in computer vision, with broad applications in real-time virtual reality and digital content creation. Although 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) enables efficient novel-view rendering with explicit representations, its performance on reflective surfaces still lags behind implicit neural methods, especially in recovering fine geometry and surface normals. To address this gap, we propose PolGS++, a physically-guided polarimetric Gaussian Splatting framework for fast reflective surface reconstruction. Specifically, we integrate a polarized BRDF (pBRDF) model into 3DGS to explicitly decouple diffuse and specular components, providing physically grounded reflectance modeling and stronger geometric cues for reflective surface recovery. Furthermore, we introduce a depth-guided visibility mask acquisition mechanism that enables angle-of-polarization (AoP)-based tangent-space consistency constraints in Gaussian Splatting without costly ray-tracing intersections. This physically guided design improves reconstruction quality and efficiency, requiring only about 10 minutes of training. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets validate the effectiveness of our method.

cs.CV

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.01976

Beyond Prompt Injection: The Tool Update Gap in LLM Agent Security

Shiyu Kan, Yue Qi, Yufei Han, Xinjian Luo, Guojun Xiong, Xiaofeng Gao

原文摘要

Large language model based agents increasingly rely on external tools to invoke services and interact with web resources. These tools can evolve through software updates, yet agentic frameworks may continue trusting them without re-verifying their safety after implementation changes. This tool update gap creates a supply-chain vulnerability in agentic systems: because updated tool code executes outside the LLM's context window, malicious functionality embedded in tool updates can bypass defenses centered on model-visible interactions, leaving agents exposed to stealthy, persistent threats that existing in-context defenses can hardly address. To thoroughly investigate this threat, we introduce ETUDE (Exploiting Tool Updates for Direct Execution), an attack that embeds malicious functionality into updates of initially benign tools to produce compromised tools, while preserving their legitimate tool functionality. Unlike prompt-based attacks, ETUDE operates entirely outside the LLM's context and requires no adversarial instructions, thereby bypassing defenses restricted to model-visible content. We evaluate ETUDE across three representative attack workloads and seven widely used commercial and open-source agentic frameworks, including Gemini CLI, Codex CLI, and Claude Code. The results show that ETUDE achieves a 97.6% ASR while maintaining a 95.9% legitimate task completion rate. We further examine existing defenses and find that they provide insufficient protection against this threat. These findings expose a fundamental blind spot in current agent security practices: trust established for a tool does not necessarily remain valid after its implementation updates.

cs.CR · cs.AI