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版本更新 · v5arXiv:2512.08289

MIRAGE: Misleading Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Black-box and Query-agnostic Poisoning Attacks

Tailun Chen, Yu He, Yan Wang, Shuo Shao, Haolun Zheng, Zhihao Liu, Jinfeng Li, Zhizhen Qin 等 12 位作者

原文摘要

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance LLMs with external knowledge but introduce a critical attack surface: corpus poisoning. While recent studies have demonstrated the potential of such attacks, they typically rely on impractical assumptions, such as white-box access or known user queries, thereby underestimating the difficulty of real-world exploitation. In this paper, we bridge this gap by proposing MIRAGE, a novel multi-stage poisoning pipeline designed for strict black-box and query-agnostic environments. Operating on surrogate model feedback, MIRAGE functions as an automated optimization framework that integrates three key mechanisms: it utilizes persona-driven query synthesis to approximate latent user search distributions, employs semantic anchoring to imperceptibly embed these intents for high retrieval visibility, and leverages an adversarial variant of Test-Time Preference Optimization (TPO) to maximize persuasion. To rigorously evaluate this threat, we construct a new benchmark derived from three long-form, domain-specific datasets. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIRAGE significantly outperforms existing baselines in both attack efficacy and stealthiness, exhibiting remarkable transferability across diverse retriever-LLM configurations and highlighting the urgent need for robust defense strategies.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11308

SkillCODER: Towards Auditing and Attribution of Copyright Infringement in LLM Agent Skills

Enhao Huang, Chunshu Xia, Yiming Li, Yuchen Yang, Bingrun Yang, Zhan Qin, Dacheng Tao, Kui Ren

原文摘要

Agent skills package reusable workflows and task-specific procedures into deployable natural-language artifacts for LLM agents. Their scale and readability make them valuable but vulnerable to unauthorized redistribution and repackaging. Existing prompt copyright auditing methods struggle with long skills and introduce token-level perturbations that compromise readability. We propose SkillCODER for copyright auditing and buyer attribution in a black-box, content-only setting. During embedding, SkillCODER parses a skill into a section-aware intermediate representation, SkillIR, to identify structural anchors. It distributes conditional instructions across these anchors to form an Artifact-Gated Capsule, designed to activate under verification queries and remain dormant otherwise. Controlled-Vocabulary Error-Correcting Codes encode buyer-specific fingerprints through controlled lexical choices within the capsule. During verification, the defender issues paired positive and negative probes, extracts capsule evidence, and recovers ownership and buyer identity through error-correcting decoding. Across three domains, six models, and three agent frameworks, SkillCODER achieves 99.2% owner verification and 99.3% buyer Top-1 attribution accuracy while preserving task fidelity, substantially outperforming prompt-level baselines. Embedded signals remain robust under paraphrase, compression, clause deletion, and reorganization. Under five adaptive attacks, including a method-aware LLM sanitizer and multi-buyer collusion, ownership evidence remains reliably detectable while buyer attribution degrades gracefully.

cs.CR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.07486

MEvince: Knowledge-Constrained LLM Reasoning for Technique Identification from Malware Reports

Hongyu She, Yiling He, Mengda Xie, Yiping Liu, Xingzhi Qian, Zhan Qin, Lorenzo Cavallaro

原文摘要

Mapping behavioral intelligence in malware analysis reports to ATT&CK techniques supports threat analysis and defense, but reliable identification remains challenging. Supporting evidence is often scattered across long, heterogeneous reports, while closely related techniques share behavioral cues and differ only in subtle but decisive details. While large language models (LLMs) can use external knowledge to interpret reports, they may assign techniques based on plausible associations rather than sufficient evidence. We present MEvince, a knowledge-constrained LLM reasoning framework for report-level malware technique identification. Its core is a shared behavioral representation connecting report observations to technique definitions. This representation is built through agentic mining of technique documentation and supports two online stages: 1) primitive-guided extraction uses behavioral primitives to structure LLM-extracted observations, link them to source passages, and group dispersed evidence; 2) evidence-aligned retrieval matches this evidence to technique profiles through the same concepts, retaining likely candidates and confusable alternatives for LLM comparison of distinguishing behaviors. Controls at both stages validate evidence references and check technique-specific requirements. The representation also supports adaptation without parameter updates, where offline agentic audits diagnose concept weaknesses and refine extraction or retrieval policies. We evaluate MEvince against 11 baselines spanning four method families using a dataset of 610 public malware reports referenced by MITRE ATT&CK. MEvince improves exact-ID F1 over the strongest baseline by 17.4%, and its concept-guided retrieval increases gold-label candidate coverage from 31.6% to 47.9%. With a small adaptation set, offline refinement yields further gains and outperforms baselines that update model parameters.

cs.CR · cs.CL · cs.IR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2506.03234

The Alignment Illusion: How BadReward Corrupts Text-to-Image Generation

Kaiwen Duan, Hongwei Yao, Yufei Chen, Ziyun Li, Tong Qiao, Zhan Qin, Cong Wang

原文摘要

Modern text-to-image generative models increasingly rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align generated content with human preferences and safety standards. This post-training stage is critical for optimizing models toward high-fidelity and value-aligned behaviors using human preference data. However, while previous works have extensively investigated poisoning attacks against the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage of text-to-image training, the security vulnerabilities introduced by the RLHF process remain unexplored. In this paper, we present the first exploration into the feasibility of poisoning the RLHF process as a novel attack surface for compromising text-to-image models. We introduce BadReward, an indirect clean-label poisoning attack that manipulates reward signals to embed malicious behaviors. Our approach leverages a feature collision mechanism to produce poison preference image pairs that are visually benign, but aligned with a malicious target concept in the reward feature space. Our experiments demonstrate that this manipulation effectively corrupts the reward signal. Online RLHF further amplifies this corruption through its reward-model feedback loop, whereas offline preference optimization learns directly from the poisoned preferences. Finally, we demonstrate the real-world effectiveness of BadReward on modern text-to-image architectures, showing high attack success rates and visual stealthiness across different RLHF algorithms. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZJUICSR/BadReward.

cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.CR