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arXiv:2409.18248 · v3

On the Vulnerability of Lane Detectors to Physical Shadow Attack

首次提交 2024-09-27 03:43
版本更新 2026-11-19 05:15
雷达观测 2026-11-21 12:18
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摘要

Automated Lane Centering (ALC) systems are critical components of Level 2 autonomous vehicles, yet their reliance on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for lane detection introduces security vulnerabilities. This work introduces the Negative Shadow (NS) Attack, a novel physical-world adversarial technique that exploits intensity bias in shadow-removal preprocessing, where bright patches within shadowed regions are misclassified as genuine lane markings. Unlike previous attacks requiring illegal road markings, the NS attack is passive and stealthy, utilizing sunlight filtered through shaped occluders placed on private property to cast patterns onto the roadway. We utilize a genetic algorithm to optimize the geometry of these shadows against three state-of-the-art lane detection systems: CLRerNet, HybridNets, and TwinLiteNet. The attack is evaluated across three hazard scenarios -- left-turn deviation, head-on collision, and off-road deviation -- using software-in-the-loop simulations with CARLA-OpenPilot, which demonstrated violation rates of up to 100%. Further validation is provided through a miniature road testbed and a real-world deployment where the attack successfully caused a Comma 3X-equipped vehicle to depart its lane. Additionally, a human-subject study indicates high stealth, with 83.6% of participants failing to detect the adversarial patterns, and an assessment of input-preprocessing defenses shows they offer only limited protection against this threat.

作者备注:Accepted to the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2026

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v3 · 2026-11-19 05:15 · 最新观测版本

On the Vulnerability of Lane Detectors to Physical Shadow Attack

Automated Lane Centering (ALC) systems are critical components of Level 2 autonomous vehicles, yet their reliance on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for lane detection introduces security vulnerabilities. This work introduces the Negative Shadow (NS) Attack, a novel physical-world adversarial technique that exploits intensity bias in shadow-removal preprocessing, where bright patches within shadowed regions are misclassified as genuine lane markings. Unlike previous attacks requiring illegal road markings, the NS attack is passive and stealthy, utilizing sunlight filtered through shaped occluders placed on private property to cast patterns onto the roadway. We utilize a genetic algorithm to optimize the geometry of these shadows against three state-of-the-art lane detection systems: CLRerNet, HybridNets, and TwinLiteNet. The attack is evaluated across three hazard scenarios -- left-turn deviation, head-on collision, and off-road deviation -- using software-in-the-loop simulations with CARLA-OpenPilot, which demonstrated violation rates of up to 100%. Further validation is provided through a miniature road testbed and a real-world deployment where the attack successfully caused a Comma 3X-equipped vehicle to depart its lane. Additionally, a human-subject study indicates high stealth, with 83.6% of participants failing to detect the adversarial patterns, and an assessment of input-preprocessing defenses shows they offer only limited protection against this threat.

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