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arXiv:2511.17351 · v2

Convergence and stability of Q-learning in Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning

首次提交 2025-11-22 00:13
版本更新 2026-11-13 01:24
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
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摘要

Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning promises, among other benefits, to efficiently capture and utilize the temporal structure of a decision-making problem and to enhance transfer learning capabilities, but theoretical guarantees lag behind practice. In this paper, we propose a Feudal Q-learning scheme and investigate under which conditions its coupled updates converge and are stable. By leveraging the theory of Stochastic Approximation and the ODE method, we present a theorem stating the convergence and stability properties of Feudal Q-learning. This provides a principled convergence and stability analysis tailored to Feudal RL. Moreover, we show that the updates converge to a point that can be interpreted as an equilibrium of a suitably defined game, opening the door to game-theoretic approaches to Hierarchical RL. Lastly, experiments based on the Feudal Q-learning algorithm support the outcomes anticipated by theory.

期刊信息:M. Manenti and A. Iannelli, Convergence and stability of Q-learning in Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning, Neurocomputing, vol. 710, p. 135319, 2027

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v2 · 2026-11-13 01:24 · 最新观测版本

Convergence and stability of Q-learning in Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning

Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning promises, among other benefits, to efficiently capture and utilize the temporal structure of a decision-making problem and to enhance transfer learning capabilities, but theoretical guarantees lag behind practice. In this paper, we propose a Feudal Q-learning scheme and investigate under which conditions its coupled updates converge and are stable. By leveraging the theory of Stochastic Approximation and the ODE method, we present a theorem stating the convergence and stability properties of Feudal Q-learning. This provides a principled convergence and stability analysis tailored to Feudal RL. Moreover, we show that the updates converge to a point that can be interpreted as an equilibrium of a suitably defined game, opening the door to game-theoretic approaches to Hierarchical RL. Lastly, experiments based on the Feudal Q-learning algorithm support the outcomes anticipated by theory.

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