← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2605.07419 · v2
Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
首次提交 2026-05-08 16:14
版本更新 2026-11-19 17:33
雷达观测 2026-11-20 19:58
摘要
As large language models (LLMs) become a common source of information, users may contribute less original knowledge to the public communities on which model development depends. Platforms seeking user contributions must account for privacy and effort costs and the incentive to rely on contributions from others. We study this dilemma in a threshold public-goods model with heterogeneous user costs. Under uniform per-unit subsidies, users can be paid even when aggregate contributions fall short of the improvement threshold. To address this subsidy leakage, we develop a mechanism that combines verifiable cost disclosure, personalized contribution assignments, and voluntary withdrawal. We show that rational assignment leads either to profitable provision or to no collection. Simultaneous withdrawal minimizes contribution costs when both protocols succeed, while small-first sequential withdrawal can sustain provision under a wider range of cost conditions. Numerical experiments quantify the effects on provision probability and social welfare. In an exploratory dialogue experiment, we evaluate LLM agents based on 50 anonymized American Community Survey profiles under all three mechanisms, generating 150 trajectories to compare contribution and withdrawal decisions under matched conditions. These findings clarify how assignment rules and withdrawal timing can support collective data provision while preserving user control.
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v2 · 2026-11-19 17:33 · 最新观测版本
Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
As large language models (LLMs) become a common source of information, users may contribute less original knowledge to the public communities on which model development depends. Platforms seeking user contributions must account for privacy and effort costs and the incentive to rely on contributions from others. We study this dilemma in a threshold public-goods model with heterogeneous user costs. Under uniform per-unit subsidies, users can be paid even when aggregate contributions fall short of the improvement threshold. To address this subsidy leakage, we develop a mechanism that combines verifiable cost disclosure, personalized contribution assignments, and voluntary withdrawal. We show that rational assignment leads either to profitable provision or to no collection. Simultaneous withdrawal minimizes contribution costs when both protocols succeed, while small-first sequential withdrawal can sustain provision under a wider range of cost conditions. Numerical experiments quantify the effects on provision probability and social welfare. In an exploratory dialogue experiment, we evaluate LLM agents based on 50 anonymized American Community Survey profiles under all three mechanisms, generating 150 trajectories to compare contribution and withdrawal decisions under matched conditions. These findings clarify how assignment rules and withdrawal timing can support collective data provision while preserving user control.
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