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arXiv:2607.00772 · v3

No Country for Old Privacy: The Evolving Challenges of Anonymity in Bitcoin

比特币匿名性的演变挑战:老隐私无处安放

首次提交 2026-07-01 18:57
版本更新 2026-11-20 02:17
雷达观测 2026-11-20 12:52
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5 million candidate CoinJoin and 23.3 million candidate CoinSwap transactions. Notably, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the operation of coordinator-based CoinJoin services such as Wasabi and Whirlpool. Our analysis reveals consistently low adoption rates, with these protocols typically constituting less than 1% of network transactions, and a sharp decline in detectable usage following key regulatory events. Furthermore, we find no evidence of standardised Stealth Address adoption, indicating a failure to converge on a common privacy standard. This study provides a comprehensive picture of a niche ecosystem whose on-chain visibility has been largely suppressed, strongly suggesting the migration of privacy-seeking users to less transparent and less detectable methods.

作者备注:9 pages, 7 figures, Accepted to the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Ledger Technologies (ICDLT 2026)

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基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

作者通过纵向测量发现,比特币网络中可检测的第二代匿名化协议采用率长期低于1%,监管事件后明显下降,且未形成统一的Stealth Address标准。

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v3 · 2026-11-20 02:17 · 最新观测版本

No Country for Old Privacy: The Evolving Challenges of Anonymity in Bitcoin

We present a longitudinal measurement study on the adoption of detectable, second-generation anonymisation protocols in the Bitcoin network, including CoinJoin, CoinSwap, CoinShuffle and Stealth Addresses. By implementing and refining a suite of heuristic filters, we identify over 5 million candidate CoinJoin and 23.3 million candidate CoinSwap transactions. Notably, the use of CoinShuffle was unexpectedly found to be closely aligned with the operation of coordinator-based CoinJoin services such as Wasabi and Whirlpool. Our analysis reveals consistently low adoption rates, with these protocols typically constituting less than 1% of network transactions, and a sharp decline in detectable usage following key regulatory events. Furthermore, we find no evidence of standardised Stealth Address adoption, indicating a failure to converge on a common privacy standard. This study provides a comprehensive picture of a niche ecosystem whose on-chain visibility has been largely suppressed, strongly suggesting the migration of privacy-seeking users to less transparent and less detectable methods.

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