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arXiv:2607.18659 · v2

Broken Gates: Re-evaluating Web Bot Defenses in the Age of LLM Agents

首次提交 2026-07-21 11:02
版本更新 2026-11-06 06:46
雷达观测 2026-11-09 10:16
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摘要

The rapid emergence of web automation across commercial crawlers, solver services, and LLM-based browser agents has created new challenges for defenses that must distinguish legitimate automated activity from scalable abuse. In response, modern bot defenses increasingly replace explicit challenges with risk-based decisions over browser, session, identity, and behavioral signals. This paper explores how current automation stacks can bypass these defenses end-to-end, evaluating seven commercial solver services and eight LLM-based browser agents against four widely deployed defenses. We find that solver services largely defeat challenge-based defenses with a 100% success rate, but collapse to an average 23% success rate on reCaptcha v3. Browser agents encounter a different bottleneck: the browser and account state presented to the verifier. Controlled experiments across browser configurations show that an established consumer account and persistent Chrome state strongly affect reCaptcha v2/v3 acceptance in our deployments, whereas Cloudflare Turnstile exhibits substantially greater sensitivity to the agent's browser control path. Reconstructing the established browser environment enables previously rejected agents to pass without model retraining. Once established, this trusted environment transfers across the agents and defenses in our testbed, adding no measurable defense-specific marginal cost to the surrounding workflow. These results expose an inherent security tension in modern non-interactive defenses: to eliminate friction, the signals they trust must be accessible to everyday human users, yet this accessibility inherently guarantees that adversaries can acquire, reproduce, and transfer the same identity signals to scale automated abuse.

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v2 · 2026-11-06 06:46 · 最新观测版本

Broken Gates: Re-evaluating Web Bot Defenses in the Age of LLM Agents

The rapid emergence of web automation across commercial crawlers, solver services, and LLM-based browser agents has created new challenges for defenses that must distinguish legitimate automated activity from scalable abuse. In response, modern bot defenses increasingly replace explicit challenges with risk-based decisions over browser, session, identity, and behavioral signals. This paper explores how current automation stacks can bypass these defenses end-to-end, evaluating seven commercial solver services and eight LLM-based browser agents against four widely deployed defenses. We find that solver services largely defeat challenge-based defenses with a 100% success rate, but collapse to an average 23% success rate on reCaptcha v3. Browser agents encounter a different bottleneck: the browser and account state presented to the verifier. Controlled experiments across browser configurations show that an established consumer account and persistent Chrome state strongly affect reCaptcha v2/v3 acceptance in our deployments, whereas Cloudflare Turnstile exhibits substantially greater sensitivity to the agent's browser control path. Reconstructing the established browser environment enables previously rejected agents to pass without model retraining. Once established, this trusted environment transfers across the agents and defenses in our testbed, adding no measurable defense-specific marginal cost to the surrounding workflow. These results expose an inherent security tension in modern non-interactive defenses: to eliminate friction, the signals they trust must be accessible to everyday human users, yet this accessibility inherently guarantees that adversaries can acquire, reproduce, and transfer the same identity signals to scale automated abuse.

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