arXiv:2610.04543 · v2

Quantum Machine Learning Protection of Military Quantum Key Distribution Against Cryptographically Camouflaged Attacks

首次提交 2026-10-03 22:16

版本更新 2026-11-12 00:24

雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:16

摘要

Quantum key distribution proves its protocol secure and says nothing about the hardware beneath it, so military and government operators fielding it for command-and-control keys monitor the channel for implementation attacks, and that monitoring has a blind spot. An adversary with a kleptographic foothold in the generator of a public per-block value $x=g^v \pmod p$ can hide attacked blocks in honest noise, gating them on a predicate of its discrete logarithm, making detection a discrete logarithm problem that defeats every efficient classical monitor yet yields to a quantum kernel recovering $v$ through Shor's algorithm. I formalise these cryptographically camouflaged attacks, reduce their hardness to an established learning separation, prove a single-frequency fidelity kernel cannot represent an interval predicate, and test them on Ghillie, a decoy-state BB84 simulator with a positive key rate to 142 km. From 10- to 14-bit groups over two seeds, a classical monitor reads 0.458 to 0.516 on camouflaged attacks while the quantum kernel reads 1.000, and both catch overt attacks above 0.99. Finite-precision recovery under depolarising noise and a hardened predicate lower the quantum result to 0.916 through 0.983 with the classical monitor at chance, and a feasibility probe on IBM Heron processors tracks the exact kernel within 0.034. A defender can therefore discard precisely the compromised key material, although the advantage is asymptotic, awaits fault tolerance, and holds only when the feature map matches the adversary's predicate, since a low-frequency map reads 0.545 on a residue pattern and 0.982 once aligned.