← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2610.36261 · v1
The Complexity of Strategizing Against No-Regret Learners: Pure When It Is Easy, Hard Even When Mixed
首次提交 2026-10-27 04:38
版本更新 2026-10-27 04:38
雷达观测 2026-10-29 00:35
摘要
We study the computational complexity of clairvoyant strategy optimization against a known online learner in finite-horizon repeated games. In general-sum games with bounded payoffs, unless $\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}$, no polynomial-time optimizer can achieve a reward within $cT$ of the reward of the optimal pure-action sequence for an absolute constant $c>0$, even when allowed to output explicitly represented mixed strategies at every round. Our hardness result strengthens prior work along two complementary axes: it extends to a broader class of learning dynamics, including widely used mean-based algorithms, answering an open question of Assos, Dagan, and Rajaraman (2025) for learners beyond multiplicative weights; and it permits mixed outputs while retaining the weaker pure-sequence benchmark. Thus, neither mixed strategies nor algorithmic specificity removes the computational obstruction in general-sum games. In sharp contrast, zero-sum games exhibit the reverse phenomenon: deterministic pure actions suffice for efficiently recovering the leading surplus guarantees previously obtained through mixed play against Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) opponents. Thus, the two regimes form a striking mirror image: mixed play cannot overcome general-sum hardness even against a pure benchmark, whereas pure play retains the full surplus guarantees of mixed strategies in zero-sum games.
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v1 · 2026-10-27 04:38 · 最新观测版本
The Complexity of Strategizing Against No-Regret Learners: Pure When It Is Easy, Hard Even When Mixed
We study the computational complexity of clairvoyant strategy optimization against a known online learner in finite-horizon repeated games. In general-sum games with bounded payoffs, unless $\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}$, no polynomial-time optimizer can achieve a reward within $cT$ of the reward of the optimal pure-action sequence for an absolute constant $c>0$, even when allowed to output explicitly represented mixed strategies at every round. Our hardness result strengthens prior work along two complementary axes: it extends to a broader class of learning dynamics, including widely used mean-based algorithms, answering an open question of Assos, Dagan, and Rajaraman (2025) for learners beyond multiplicative weights; and it permits mixed outputs while retaining the weaker pure-sequence benchmark. Thus, neither mixed strategies nor algorithmic specificity removes the computational obstruction in general-sum games. In sharp contrast, zero-sum games exhibit the reverse phenomenon: deterministic pure actions suffice for efficiently recovering the leading surplus guarantees previously obtained through mixed play against Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) opponents. Thus, the two regimes form a striking mirror image: mixed play cannot overcome general-sum hardness even against a pure benchmark, whereas pure play retains the full surplus guarantees of mixed strategies in zero-sum games.
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