跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.02938 · v1

Leakage-Aware Encrypted Semantic Communication with Key-Conditioned Signal Perturbation

首次提交 2026-11-02 19:05
版本更新 2026-11-02 19:05
雷达观测 2026-11-04 23:42
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Encrypted semantic communication systems protect transmitted messages by inserting key-conditioned modules into a deep-learning semantic communication pipeline, but existing designs rely on a fixed adversarial weight and operate mainly at the semantic-feature level. We propose two changes to the encrypted semantic communication system (ESCS): a key-conditioned signal-domain perturbation layer, called learned adversarial perturbation injection (LAPI), and an information noise-contrastive estimation (InfoNCE)-guided adaptive training rule that {adds an adaptive leakage penalty alongside the fixed adversarial objective} using an InfoNCE-based proxy for mutual information leakage. Experiments on the Europarl corpus over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading channels show that InfoNCE-guided training is the primary source of eavesdropper suppression, reducing the eavesdropper's bilingual evaluation understudy (BLEU) score to approximately 0.07 at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Adding LAPI to the InfoNCE-guided objective further lowers the InfoNCE-estimated leakage by 5-9% with low measured inference overhead, while its impact on legitimate-receiver BLEU depends on channel conditions. The two mechanisms operate on different parts of the pipeline and can be jointly applied.

作者备注:Accepted for presentation at IEEE GLOBECOM 2026

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只观测到一个版本,无法比较变化。之后收录新版本时,会在这里对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-02 19:05 · 最新观测版本

Leakage-Aware Encrypted Semantic Communication with Key-Conditioned Signal Perturbation

Encrypted semantic communication systems protect transmitted messages by inserting key-conditioned modules into a deep-learning semantic communication pipeline, but existing designs rely on a fixed adversarial weight and operate mainly at the semantic-feature level. We propose two changes to the encrypted semantic communication system (ESCS): a key-conditioned signal-domain perturbation layer, called learned adversarial perturbation injection (LAPI), and an information noise-contrastive estimation (InfoNCE)-guided adaptive training rule that {adds an adaptive leakage penalty alongside the fixed adversarial objective} using an InfoNCE-based proxy for mutual information leakage. Experiments on the Europarl corpus over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading channels show that InfoNCE-guided training is the primary source of eavesdropper suppression, reducing the eavesdropper's bilingual evaluation understudy (BLEU) score to approximately 0.07 at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Adding LAPI to the InfoNCE-guided objective further lowers the InfoNCE-estimated leakage by 5-9% with low measured inference overhead, while its impact on legitimate-receiver BLEU depends on channel conditions. The two mechanisms operate on different parts of the pipeline and can be jointly applied.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗