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arXiv:2611.10229 · v1

Proportionality in Elections under Feasibility Constraints and Ranked Ballots: The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule

首次提交 2026-11-07 05:17
版本更新 2026-11-07 05:17
雷达观测 2026-11-10 10:11
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摘要

We study elections with ranked ballots and general feasibility constraints, which indicate which sets of candidates are allowed as outcomes. We introduce the first proportionality axiom for this general setting and show that it extends the established notions from specific models that fit our general framework. We extend the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule to general constraints and prove that it satisfies our axiom exactly for matroid constraints. Although the naive implementation of SCR involves a step that is computationally intractable for weak orders, we show that in practical cases it can be implemented in polynomial time or efficiently in FPT time. We also illustrate limitations of this rule for approval ballots and provide its first empirical evaluation.

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v1 · 2026-11-07 05:17 · 最新观测版本

Proportionality in Elections under Feasibility Constraints and Ranked Ballots: The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule

We study elections with ranked ballots and general feasibility constraints, which indicate which sets of candidates are allowed as outcomes. We introduce the first proportionality axiom for this general setting and show that it extends the established notions from specific models that fit our general framework. We extend the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule to general constraints and prove that it satisfies our axiom exactly for matroid constraints. Although the naive implementation of SCR involves a step that is computationally intractable for weak orders, we show that in practical cases it can be implemented in polynomial time or efficiently in FPT time. We also illustrate limitations of this rule for approval ballots and provide its first empirical evaluation.

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