arXiv:2611.10294 · v1

Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply

首次提交 2026-11-07 06:44

版本更新 2026-11-07 06:44

雷达观测 2026-11-10 10:11

摘要

This paper performs a robust analysis of welfare (i.e., the price of anarchy) in multi-unit first-price auctions with independent private values and unit-demand bidders. We employ a smoothness framework (see \citealp{ST-13}) to analyze the price of anarchy when supply is large. The main barrier to analysis in this framework is a worst-case bid distribution that establishes a lower bound on the price of anarchy of $1- \frac{1}{e}$. We show that such worst-case distributions cannot arise in equilibrium when agents' values satisfy a mild density lower bound condition. This characterization leads to novel asymptotic lower bounds. In particular, the price of anarchy for $ε$-approximate equilibrium as the number of units goes to infinity is at least $1-Θ\left(ε\log \left(\frac{1}ε\right)\right)$. Our analysis relies on a key structural property of equilibrium bid distributions: for a welfare analysis in any multi-unit first-price auction, it is without loss to analyze (approximate) equilibria with no atoms. In addition to this, we establish continuity and monotonicity properties of Bayes-Nash equilibria. We believe these results are of independent interest.