← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.10947 · v1
Validating AI-Discovered Cloud Threats on Live Infrastructure: A Multi-Model, Multi-Cloud Study
首次提交 2026-11-08 04:23
版本更新 2026-11-08 04:23
雷达观测 2026-11-10 11:14
摘要
Cloud infrastructure threat modeling lacks empirical validation of AI-discovered threats. We present a three-phase methodology of multi-agent threat discovery, automated exploit synthesis, and non-destructive live validation, and apply it to three commercial foundation models on two cloud architectures, validating each threat natively on the cloud (AWS, GCP, or Azure) it was discovered against. Of 233 AI-discovered threats, 103 were confirmed and 34 refuted (75.2\% precision, 95\% CI [67.3, 81.7]); 44 were conditional (the named mechanism refuted but an equivalent impact shown through another path) and 52 indeterminate. Multi-model discovery helped through breadth, not agreement: the three models together found 2.2 the confirmed threats of the best single model at comparable precision, while threats reported by several models were confirmed no more often than single-model ones. False positives were not architecture-specific: they asserted access or system state the deployment did not have. Threats coded in advance as observable configuration resolved cleanly more often than multi-step behavioral threats (72.5\% vs.\ 51.6\%), which were more often conditional, suggesting that models more often misidentify the exploitation mechanism than the underlying weakness. AI-assisted discovery is a practical input to security workflows when paired with empirical validation.
作者备注:8 pages, 3 figures, CSTA 2026
观测到的版本
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v1 · 2026-11-08 04:23 · 最新观测版本
Validating AI-Discovered Cloud Threats on Live Infrastructure: A Multi-Model, Multi-Cloud Study
Cloud infrastructure threat modeling lacks empirical validation of AI-discovered threats. We present a three-phase methodology of multi-agent threat discovery, automated exploit synthesis, and non-destructive live validation, and apply it to three commercial foundation models on two cloud architectures, validating each threat natively on the cloud (AWS, GCP, or Azure) it was discovered against. Of 233 AI-discovered threats, 103 were confirmed and 34 refuted (75.2\% precision, 95\% CI [67.3, 81.7]); 44 were conditional (the named mechanism refuted but an equivalent impact shown through another path) and 52 indeterminate. Multi-model discovery helped through breadth, not agreement: the three models together found 2.2 the confirmed threats of the best single model at comparable precision, while threats reported by several models were confirmed no more often than single-model ones. False positives were not architecture-specific: they asserted access or system state the deployment did not have. Threats coded in advance as observable configuration resolved cleanly more often than multi-step behavioral threats (72.5\% vs.\ 51.6\%), which were more often conditional, suggesting that models more often misidentify the exploitation mechanism than the underlying weakness. AI-assisted discovery is a practical input to security workflows when paired with empirical validation.
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