arXiv:2611.11029 · v1

Evolutionary games on networks with negative edge-based environmental feedback

首次提交 2026-11-08 08:09

版本更新 2026-11-08 08:09

雷达观测 2026-11-10 12:16

摘要

Environmental feedback can fundamentally alter the game payoff structure underlying the evolution of cooperation. How feedback-evolving games interact with population structure under non-weak selection remains incompletely understood. We study an evolutionary game on networks in which each edge has a binary environmental state that determines the payoff matrix used by the two connected individuals. By assumption, cooperation tends to improve the local environment, which in turn favors defection, thereby creating negative feedback between strategies coupled with the environmental condition. We analyze the model under strong selection using a mean-field approximation, a pair approximation that tracks both strategy pairs and edge environments, and agent-based simulations. In well-mixed populations, the feedback can generate bistability between full cooperation and full defection, as well as sustained oscillations arising through a Hopf bifurcation. Sparse networks (i.e., with low nodes' degrees) can eliminate bistability, suppress oscillations, and produce stable intermediate levels of cooperation. The pair approximation captures these effects and generally agrees more closely with simulations on sparse networks than the mean-field approximation. Our results show that edge-based environmental feedback and network structure, such as density of edges, interact to determine whether the fraction of cooperators stabilizes or oscillates over time.

作者备注：8 figures