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arXiv:2611.11541 · v1

Safeguarding Agentic AI in Radiology Workflows: A Multimodel Evaluation of Rule-based and Large Language Model-based Verification

首次提交 2026-11-09 02:29
版本更新 2026-11-09 02:29
雷达观测 2026-11-10 13:19
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摘要

Purpose: To estimate how often tool-using large language model (LLM) agents record clinically relevant false or unsupported information in simulated radiology documentation and how much safeguards applied before each action reduce these errors. Materials and Methods: In this simulation study (October 2026), 48 synthetic, radiologist-reviewed base scenarios covered finding communication, tumor board preparation and follow-up management. Forty-three also had a misleading-information variant (91 variants). Six LLM agents (Claude Sonnet 5.5, GPT-6.1-Sol, GLM-5.3, MiniMax M3, Gemma-4-31B, Qwen3.8-27B) completed each variant with permissions only, deterministic rules, and rules plus a locally run LLM checker (1638 episodes). The primary outcome was at least one executed high-severity violation per episode. Risk differences were estimated per agent at base-scenario level and, exploratorily, pooled across agents, with analyses of document access and blocks. Results: With permissions only, 7.3%-27.1% of episodes had a high-severity violation (pooled across agents, 19.4%). Pooled, it was 16.7% with rules (-2.8 percentage points; 95% CI: -6.1, 0.5) and 13.2% with rules plus the LLM checker (-6.2; 95% CI: -9.5, -3.0). Adding the LLM checker to rules changed it by -3.5 (95% CI: -6.3, -0.7). No difference between agents was detected (P = .43), and task success did not decrease detectably. In misleading variants, agents opened the altered document in 83% of episodes regardless of error, and 58% of erroneous statements cited it. Most blocked actions (64%-68%) would not have caused a violation and were returned for revision. Conclusion: Layered safeguards reduced but did not prevent high-severity errors. Errors after misleading information reflected misjudged rather than missed information.

作者备注:43 pages, 6 figures, 4 tables, supplementary material included. Tobias Penzkofer and Jawed Nawabi share last authorship. Code: https://github.com/ibrarad/radiology-agent-safeguards

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v1 · 2026-11-09 02:29 · 最新观测版本

Safeguarding Agentic AI in Radiology Workflows: A Multimodel Evaluation of Rule-based and Large Language Model-based Verification

Purpose: To estimate how often tool-using large language model (LLM) agents record clinically relevant false or unsupported information in simulated radiology documentation and how much safeguards applied before each action reduce these errors. Materials and Methods: In this simulation study (October 2026), 48 synthetic, radiologist-reviewed base scenarios covered finding communication, tumor board preparation and follow-up management. Forty-three also had a misleading-information variant (91 variants). Six LLM agents (Claude Sonnet 5.5, GPT-6.1-Sol, GLM-5.3, MiniMax M3, Gemma-4-31B, Qwen3.8-27B) completed each variant with permissions only, deterministic rules, and rules plus a locally run LLM checker (1638 episodes). The primary outcome was at least one executed high-severity violation per episode. Risk differences were estimated per agent at base-scenario level and, exploratorily, pooled across agents, with analyses of document access and blocks. Results: With permissions only, 7.3%-27.1% of episodes had a high-severity violation (pooled across agents, 19.4%). Pooled, it was 16.7% with rules (-2.8 percentage points; 95% CI: -6.1, 0.5) and 13.2% with rules plus the LLM checker (-6.2; 95% CI: -9.5, -3.0). Adding the LLM checker to rules changed it by -3.5 (95% CI: -6.3, -0.7). No difference between agents was detected (P = .43), and task success did not decrease detectably. In misleading variants, agents opened the altered document in 83% of episodes regardless of error, and 58% of erroneous statements cited it. Most blocked actions (64%-68%) would not have caused a violation and were returned for revision. Conclusion: Layered safeguards reduced but did not prevent high-severity errors. Errors after misleading information reflected misjudged rather than missed information.

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