arXiv:2611.11571 · v1
Treating the Model as an Untrusted Component: Deterministic Policy Enforcement, Human Approval and Taint Tracking Against Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Agents, with Validation on Open-Weights Models
摘要
Tool-using LLM agents act on instructions embedded in the data they read, so prompt injection is a structural rather than a prompt-wording problem. We compare in-prompt defences (hardened prompts, spotlighting, LLM detectors) with deterministic enforcement outside the model (four reference monitors of increasing strength), human approval and taint tracking, judged by one effect-based oracle independent of every defence in an executable environment of 13 tasks and 12 tools, with argument-fuzzing attackers and severity-weighted harm. In an evaluation with real open-weights models (Qwen2.5-1.5B and Qwen2.5-7B; 156 attack episodes per defence and model), the models proposed the attacker's call in 64% and 84% of attack episodes behind the task-bound monitor, which admitted 1.3% and 7.7%; guardrail effects depended on the model (a prompt guardrail moved obedience from 67% to 65% and from 86% to 55%, spotlighting plus a detector to 12% and 0%) against static attacks. Simulation with an assumed model covers what no real run did: under the assumed erosion law a persistent adaptive attacker or a compromised model drives every guardrail stack to 100.0% attack success, whereas the task-bound monitor holds severe actions at 0.0%; its residual (harm 0.69/10) falls by 62% under taint-triggered human review, and a human layer without a deterministic monitor fails against approval spamming unless each episode has a deterministic approval budget. Implementation quality matters: a naive monitor admits 18 of 33 effective attack variants, a hardened one 6 and a capability-bound one 1. The real-model evidence is limited to two open-weights models and static attacks, the human-approval and taint results are simulation-only, and the larger model's detector stack contradicts the assumed erosion law. Code, data, a two-rater oracle audit and a notebook for repeating the real-model evaluation are provided.
作者备注：23 pages, 8 figures, 18 tables. Original research contribution. Code, data and the two-rater oracle audit: https://github.com/nawaralseelawi/untrusted-model-agentsec