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arXiv:2611.12070 · v1

Color wave: A systematic evaluation of active screen illumination for injection attack detection in remote face authentication

首次提交 2026-11-09 16:44
版本更新 2026-11-09 16:44
雷达观测 2026-11-10 15:22
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摘要

Remote face authentication requires protection against both presentation attacks and biometric data injection attacks prior to face matching. Methods based on active screen illumination appear promising for both by introducing randomized visual stimuli through the user's device screen and evaluating the corresponding facial responses. Although such methods have been more studied for presentation attack detection (PAD), their systematic evaluation for injection attack detection (IAD) remains limited. To address this gap, we first classify injected content into static images, prerecorded videos, and real-time deepfakes based on their expected responses to the challenge. We then adapt an active screen-illumination approach into an implementation we term color wave and develop a systematic, injection-specific evaluation protocol. The protocol examines detection effectiveness, generalization across operating conditions, robustness to signal degradation, and susceptibility to selected evasion strategies. The findings demonstrate a strong discriminative signal under controlled conditions but also reveal performance limitations under overexposure, low screen brightness, and subject motion, as well as vulnerabilities to selected evasion strategies. By relating detection outcomes to attack types and operating conditions, this study provides an interpretable assessment of when and why active screen illumination succeeds or fails as an IAD mechanism.

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v1 · 2026-11-09 16:44 · 最新观测版本

Color wave: A systematic evaluation of active screen illumination for injection attack detection in remote face authentication

Remote face authentication requires protection against both presentation attacks and biometric data injection attacks prior to face matching. Methods based on active screen illumination appear promising for both by introducing randomized visual stimuli through the user's device screen and evaluating the corresponding facial responses. Although such methods have been more studied for presentation attack detection (PAD), their systematic evaluation for injection attack detection (IAD) remains limited. To address this gap, we first classify injected content into static images, prerecorded videos, and real-time deepfakes based on their expected responses to the challenge. We then adapt an active screen-illumination approach into an implementation we term color wave and develop a systematic, injection-specific evaluation protocol. The protocol examines detection effectiveness, generalization across operating conditions, robustness to signal degradation, and susceptibility to selected evasion strategies. The findings demonstrate a strong discriminative signal under controlled conditions but also reveal performance limitations under overexposure, low screen brightness, and subject motion, as well as vulnerabilities to selected evasion strategies. By relating detection outcomes to attack types and operating conditions, this study provides an interpretable assessment of when and why active screen illumination succeeds or fails as an IAD mechanism.

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