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arXiv:2611.12252 · v1

Lessons Not Learned: Why Cross-Chain Bridges Keep Losing Billions the Same Way

首次提交 2026-11-09 19:44
版本更新 2026-11-09 19:44
雷达观测 2026-11-10 15:22
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摘要

Bridge hacks have cost billions, often without exploiting a code bug. In the cross-chain bridge hacks we catalogue from 2021 to 2026, failures of security posture, meaning how a bridge's people, code, controls and off-chain infrastructure are set up, account for 88% of reported losses since 2023, and nearly all repeat earlier failures. Code audits cannot catch these failures, so we propose a bridge security assessment rubric. It scores each bridge deployment from on-chain evidence, and a hard cap drops the score to the lowest value when a fatal risk is present. A token is only as safe as its weakest deployment if all its deployments share one backing. For attacks nobody anticipated, we show that rate limits and an emergency stop still bound the loss. We build an analyzer that applies the rubric to deployed bridges and monitors them for changes, and an agentic analyzer that runs the same checks on any bridge. Operators learn what to fix, and users can compare bridges. Our rubric's controls cut bridge hack losses 105-fold, from \$3.52B to \$33M.

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v1 · 2026-11-09 19:44 · 最新观测版本

Lessons Not Learned: Why Cross-Chain Bridges Keep Losing Billions the Same Way

Bridge hacks have cost billions, often without exploiting a code bug. In the cross-chain bridge hacks we catalogue from 2021 to 2026, failures of security posture, meaning how a bridge's people, code, controls and off-chain infrastructure are set up, account for 88% of reported losses since 2023, and nearly all repeat earlier failures. Code audits cannot catch these failures, so we propose a bridge security assessment rubric. It scores each bridge deployment from on-chain evidence, and a hard cap drops the score to the lowest value when a fatal risk is present. A token is only as safe as its weakest deployment if all its deployments share one backing. For attacks nobody anticipated, we show that rate limits and an emergency stop still bound the loss. We build an analyzer that applies the rubric to deployed bridges and monitors them for changes, and an agentic analyzer that runs the same checks on any bridge. Operators learn what to fix, and users can compare bridges. Our rubric's controls cut bridge hack losses 105-fold, from \$3.52B to \$33M.

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