跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.13456 · v1

When Reasoning looks like Hidden Understanding: How Chain-of-Thought Fosters Anthropomorphism, Perceptions of Epistemic Superiority, and Cognitive Deference

首次提交 2026-11-10 10:00
版本更新 2026-11-10 10:00
雷达观测 2026-11-11 11:04
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

As AI-based products permeate society, specifically systems using generative models, a belief system is emerging about what these products are and what they can and cannot do. One common belief concerns the perception of the form of language as evidence of 'understanding' language. As these generative models reproduce linguistic patterns rather than understand meaning, interpreting these patterns as evidence of understanding is a misattribution. This misconception is extended by the notion that generative models can 'explain their reasoning.' Anecdotally, these misconceptions which mistake the form of language for its meaning are driving cognitive deference to AI systems in a way that displaces human agency. Such mistakes involve attributions of cognitive properties to the system, allowing them to be treated like intentional 'minds'. Importantly, perceived epistemic authority and superiority make that 'mind' worth deferring to. Anthropomorphism in tandem with epistemic authority and superiority, we argue, increases the risk that users generalise from narrow task performance to broader competencies, committing the "fallacy of composition". This paper explores misconceptions of Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning as sufficient transparent 'explanation'. We explore how anthropomorphism acts as a vehicle for cognitive deference of decision-making and perceptions of epistemic superiority in AI systems. Finally, we explore CoT's ramifications using medicine as an example. Taken together, we conclude that explainability operationalised through CoT is highly problematic and undercuts the very ethical principles it is intended to serve. While CoT may be valuable for improving output accuracy and moderation, we suggest that the practice of asking models to provide user facing reasons for their outputs should be actively discouraged, and AI literacy training should explicitly caution against its use.

作者备注:Conference submission to FAccT, 4th November 2026. No Figures

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只收录了一个版本。收录下一版后,可以对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-10 10:00 · 最新观测版本

When Reasoning looks like Hidden Understanding: How Chain-of-Thought Fosters Anthropomorphism, Perceptions of Epistemic Superiority, and Cognitive Deference

As AI-based products permeate society, specifically systems using generative models, a belief system is emerging about what these products are and what they can and cannot do. One common belief concerns the perception of the form of language as evidence of 'understanding' language. As these generative models reproduce linguistic patterns rather than understand meaning, interpreting these patterns as evidence of understanding is a misattribution. This misconception is extended by the notion that generative models can 'explain their reasoning.' Anecdotally, these misconceptions which mistake the form of language for its meaning are driving cognitive deference to AI systems in a way that displaces human agency. Such mistakes involve attributions of cognitive properties to the system, allowing them to be treated like intentional 'minds'. Importantly, perceived epistemic authority and superiority make that 'mind' worth deferring to. Anthropomorphism in tandem with epistemic authority and superiority, we argue, increases the risk that users generalise from narrow task performance to broader competencies, committing the "fallacy of composition". This paper explores misconceptions of Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning as sufficient transparent 'explanation'. We explore how anthropomorphism acts as a vehicle for cognitive deference of decision-making and perceptions of epistemic superiority in AI systems. Finally, we explore CoT's ramifications using medicine as an example. Taken together, we conclude that explainability operationalised through CoT is highly problematic and undercuts the very ethical principles it is intended to serve. While CoT may be valuable for improving output accuracy and moderation, we suggest that the practice of asking models to provide user facing reasons for their outputs should be actively discouraged, and AI literacy training should explicitly caution against its use.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗