← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.15472 · v1
What You See Is (Not) What You Got: The Human Factor in PDF Signature Verification
首次提交 2026-11-11 21:40
版本更新 2026-11-11 21:40
雷达观测 2026-11-13 11:11
摘要
Signed PDF documents have legally binding value under frameworks such as the EU's eIDAS regulation. In this work, we present Genuine PDF Forgeries, a novel attack class that focuses on human factors in signature validation. Our attacks target the disconnect between cryptographically verifiable signer certificates and human-visible signature blocks embedded in documents. We analyze our attacks against 23 PDF viewers and validation tools across desktop platforms and the web. We find that nine of the 13 viewers that automatically report signature validity hide authenticated signer information behind additional user interaction. We then evaluate the attack in twin deception-based online studies with 584 EU-based participants. To further validate the impact, we perform a highly tailored real-world attack study with six trials within two privacy-sensitive organizations. Five of six organizational trials accepted requests authenticated using the forged visual identity. In the online studies (total n=584), the most effective attack variant deceives 71.9% of eligible participants on first impression, and 57.3% continue to be deceived even after we prompt for additional introspection. We derive viewer-side countermeasures and prototype a safeguard that overlays the untrusted signature block with signer information obtained from the validated certificate. Our results show that boolean validity indicators, not associated with the authenticated signer identity, are insufficient in practice.
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v1 · 2026-11-11 21:40 · 最新观测版本
What You See Is (Not) What You Got: The Human Factor in PDF Signature Verification
Signed PDF documents have legally binding value under frameworks such as the EU's eIDAS regulation. In this work, we present Genuine PDF Forgeries, a novel attack class that focuses on human factors in signature validation. Our attacks target the disconnect between cryptographically verifiable signer certificates and human-visible signature blocks embedded in documents. We analyze our attacks against 23 PDF viewers and validation tools across desktop platforms and the web. We find that nine of the 13 viewers that automatically report signature validity hide authenticated signer information behind additional user interaction. We then evaluate the attack in twin deception-based online studies with 584 EU-based participants. To further validate the impact, we perform a highly tailored real-world attack study with six trials within two privacy-sensitive organizations. Five of six organizational trials accepted requests authenticated using the forged visual identity. In the online studies (total n=584), the most effective attack variant deceives 71.9% of eligible participants on first impression, and 57.3% continue to be deceived even after we prompt for additional introspection. We derive viewer-side countermeasures and prototype a safeguard that overlays the untrusted signature block with signer information obtained from the validated certificate. Our results show that boolean validity indicators, not associated with the authenticated signer identity, are insufficient in practice.
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