← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.16471 · v1
Accuracy Is Not Welfare: Evaluating AI Buyers under Strategic Price Complexity in a Synthetic Duopoly
首次提交 2026-11-12 16:28
版本更新 2026-11-12 16:28
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
摘要
AI buying agents may alter sellers' incentives as well as consumers' decisions. In a synthetic duopoly, we evaluate price-comparison pipelines on a fixed menu and in empirical correlated-equilibrium games. Calculator assistance selects an optimal offer 84.00% of the time, versus 68.57% under verified-total disclosure, yet disclosure has a 20.14-unit higher consumer-worst equilibrium surplus. A frozen-strategy holdout comparison favors disclosure, while re-solving equilibria under scenario resampling produces a range spanning zero. These model-based results show why accuracy, loss severity, seller incentives, and welfare incidence require separate measurement.
作者备注：51 pages, 10 figures, 11 tables. JEL codes: D18, D43, D83, L13
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v1 · 2026-11-12 16:28 · 最新观测版本
Accuracy Is Not Welfare: Evaluating AI Buyers under Strategic Price Complexity in a Synthetic Duopoly
AI buying agents may alter sellers' incentives as well as consumers' decisions. In a synthetic duopoly, we evaluate price-comparison pipelines on a fixed menu and in empirical correlated-equilibrium games. Calculator assistance selects an optimal offer 84.00% of the time, versus 68.57% under verified-total disclosure, yet disclosure has a 20.14-unit higher consumer-worst equilibrium surplus. A frozen-strategy holdout comparison favors disclosure, while re-solving equilibria under scenario resampling produces a range spanning zero. These model-based results show why accuracy, loss severity, seller incentives, and welfare incidence require separate measurement.
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