← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.16557 · v1
Game-Theoretic Analysis of RIS-Assisted Challenge-Response PLA - Part I: Perfect Channel Knowledge
首次提交 2026-11-12 17:46
版本更新 2026-11-12 17:46
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
摘要
We consider a physical layer authentication scenario in which a legitimate user (Alice) communicates with an authen- ticator (Bob) through a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS), controlled by Bob. An attacker (Trudy) aims to impersonate Alice by suitably precoding her messages and still transmitting them through the RIS. This two-part study analyzes this attack-defense interaction between Bob and Trudy under perfect (Part I) and partial (Part II) channel knowledge by all the agents. Part I formulates the joint RIS selection and precoder design under perfect channel knowledge as a finite zero-sum game, establishing exact channel subspace conditions for attack indistinguishability alongside equilibrium mixed strategies. Part II extends the defense to incomplete channel information, where each agent observes only its own channel, by formulating a finite-action Bayesian game and characterizing the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulations in geometric and 3GPP TR 38.901 UMi-NLOS channels reveal that authentication performance is governed by available spatial degrees of freedom, channel correlation, and operating signal-to-noise ratio. The proposed equilibrium strategies effectively balance communication rate and security, outperforming conventional benchmark policies.
观测到的版本
相邻记录可能跳过中间版本；首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。
v1 · 2026-11-12 17:46 · 最新观测版本
Game-Theoretic Analysis of RIS-Assisted Challenge-Response PLA - Part I: Perfect Channel Knowledge
We consider a physical layer authentication scenario in which a legitimate user (Alice) communicates with an authen- ticator (Bob) through a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS), controlled by Bob. An attacker (Trudy) aims to impersonate Alice by suitably precoding her messages and still transmitting them through the RIS. This two-part study analyzes this attack-defense interaction between Bob and Trudy under perfect (Part I) and partial (Part II) channel knowledge by all the agents. Part I formulates the joint RIS selection and precoder design under perfect channel knowledge as a finite zero-sum game, establishing exact channel subspace conditions for attack indistinguishability alongside equilibrium mixed strategies. Part II extends the defense to incomplete channel information, where each agent observes only its own channel, by formulating a finite-action Bayesian game and characterizing the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulations in geometric and 3GPP TR 38.901 UMi-NLOS channels reveal that authentication performance is governed by available spatial degrees of freedom, channel correlation, and operating signal-to-noise ratio. The proposed equilibrium strategies effectively balance communication rate and security, outperforming conventional benchmark policies.
查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗