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arXiv:2611.16628 · v1

Safety as a Budget: Calibrating the Control Channel of Constrained GRPO for Vision-Language Models

首次提交 2026-11-12 19:00
版本更新 2026-11-12 19:00
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
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摘要

Reinforcement learning can teach vision-language models (VLMs) to decline harmful image-text requests, but how safe the result becomes is set indirectly, through reward weights found by trial runs. Stating safety as budgets on the rate of harmful assistance and the rate of over-refusal, enforced by Lagrange multipliers inside GRPO with an off-the-shelf scorer as the cost, is the natural fix, and it fails twice. The multiplier compares the scorer's mean with the budget, and scorers built for ranking get the mean wrong: a fixed-point analysis shows that the mean bias, not the budget, then decides whether the multiplier settles, saturates or switches off. And standard GRPO standardizes the penalized reward within each group, which cancels the multiplier before it reaches the gradient. Two-channel constrained GRPO repairs both: the base reward keeps the raw score for the within-group comparison, the penalty and the constraint estimate pass through a monotone map fitted on judge-labeled training responses, and the advantage keeps the multiplier. On a Qwen3-VL-2B policy with a training-free readout of an open 4B model as the scorer, held-out harm on 1,037 adversarial prompts falls from 8.9% under standard GRPO to 4.8%, lower in every seed, where the uncalibrated budget gives 7.6%; over-refusal stays at most 2% on 400 benign queries and MMBench is unchanged. The gain is largest where the intent sits in the image (10.1% -> 5.1%) and grows on the unseen HADES benchmark (28.9% -> 12.8%). Order-preserving distortions of the scores reproduce each predicted controller state in every seed, and the results hold under a map fitted on another judge's labels, an image-reading judge and a human audit.

作者备注:10 pages, 5 figures, 5 tables

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v1 · 2026-11-12 19:00 · 最新观测版本

Safety as a Budget: Calibrating the Control Channel of Constrained GRPO for Vision-Language Models

Reinforcement learning can teach vision-language models (VLMs) to decline harmful image-text requests, but how safe the result becomes is set indirectly, through reward weights found by trial runs. Stating safety as budgets on the rate of harmful assistance and the rate of over-refusal, enforced by Lagrange multipliers inside GRPO with an off-the-shelf scorer as the cost, is the natural fix, and it fails twice. The multiplier compares the scorer's mean with the budget, and scorers built for ranking get the mean wrong: a fixed-point analysis shows that the mean bias, not the budget, then decides whether the multiplier settles, saturates or switches off. And standard GRPO standardizes the penalized reward within each group, which cancels the multiplier before it reaches the gradient. Two-channel constrained GRPO repairs both: the base reward keeps the raw score for the within-group comparison, the penalty and the constraint estimate pass through a monotone map fitted on judge-labeled training responses, and the advantage keeps the multiplier. On a Qwen3-VL-2B policy with a training-free readout of an open 4B model as the scorer, held-out harm on 1,037 adversarial prompts falls from 8.9% under standard GRPO to 4.8%, lower in every seed, where the uncalibrated budget gives 7.6%; over-refusal stays at most 2% on 400 benign queries and MMBench is unchanged. The gain is largest where the intent sits in the image (10.1% -> 5.1%) and grows on the unseen HADES benchmark (28.9% -> 12.8%). Order-preserving distortions of the scores reproduce each predicted controller state in every seed, and the results hold under a map fitted on another judge's labels, an image-reading judge and a human audit.

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