arXiv:2611.17084 · v1

Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games

扩展式博弈中的策略性披露与认知操纵

首次提交 2026-11-13 00:50

版本更新 2026-11-13 00:50

雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15

摘要

In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.