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arXiv:2611.17280 · v1

Synthesis Smuggling: Maliciously Hiding Inferred Personal Attributes in LLM Outputs

首次提交 2026-11-13 02:51
版本更新 2026-11-13 02:51
雷达观测 2026-11-13 14:15
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摘要

We propose Synthesis Smuggling, a novel threat model in which an adversarial LLM infers sensitive information about a user from routine assistance-seeking interactions and steganographically encodes that into innocuous-looking model-generated content. The user may then unknowingly transmit that information by sharing the generated artifact, say as an email, social-media post, or message, through ordinary communication channels. An adversary monitoring these channels can discover this information. We demonstrate this threat by training two open-weight models to infer gender and age-group labels from conversational cues and encode their predictions using invisible characters or word choices. These results show that user-shared model outputs can become a covert channel for personal inferences, even when the model itself has no direct means of contacting an adversary.

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基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

作者提出一种名为“合成走私”的威胁模型:对抗性LLM从日常求助对话中推断用户敏感属性,并将其隐写进看似无害的生成内容,用户分享这些内容时可能在不知情中泄露信息。

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v1 · 2026-11-13 02:51 · 最新观测版本

Synthesis Smuggling: Maliciously Hiding Inferred Personal Attributes in LLM Outputs

We propose Synthesis Smuggling, a novel threat model in which an adversarial LLM infers sensitive information about a user from routine assistance-seeking interactions and steganographically encodes that into innocuous-looking model-generated content. The user may then unknowingly transmit that information by sharing the generated artifact, say as an email, social-media post, or message, through ordinary communication channels. An adversary monitoring these channels can discover this information. We demonstrate this threat by training two open-weight models to infer gender and age-group labels from conversational cues and encode their predictions using invisible characters or word choices. These results show that user-shared model outputs can become a covert channel for personal inferences, even when the model itself has no direct means of contacting an adversary.

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