跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.17910 · v1

Adversarially Attacking Symbolic Vocabulary Vulnerabilities In LLM Planners

首次提交 2026-11-13 16:51
版本更新 2026-11-13 16:51
雷达观测 2026-11-16 11:42
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, their abilities in navigating automated planning tasks have become essential. However, despite their strengths, LLMs' planning ability is not robust, particularly when they are not allowed to exploit commonsense cues in the symbolic vocabulary (e.g., names of actions, predicates, and objects) used to define planning tasks. This makes LLMs unreliable compared to symbolic planners. With recent reasoning models showing improved planning performance on tasks with obfuscated symbolic vocabularies, we utilize an adversarial attack framework to reveal to what extent the crucial weaknesses of LLM agents at joint symbolic interpretation and planning remain and whether they can reason properly when presented with severe cases. As such, our main contribution is devising an LLM-based attack model, which we call Symbolic Swapper, to automatically generate obfuscated planning domains with non-standard symbolic vocabularies that systematically break strong reasoning models' ability to plan. In doing so, we reveal how much LLMs' planning abilities can be further degraded under more advanced obfuscation schemes, allowing us to ascertain their success when having to rely on their pure planning ability. We find that attacks can decrease the planning performance of base models and even robust planning frameworks by over 70%. We further analyze the factors behind how LLM planning abilities break down and find that successful obfuscation causes models to appear to significantly degrade in reasoning quality despite them showing some inherent ability to understand the domain, revealing a gap in the perception of a task domain and being able to plan under it.

作者备注:Published at NeurIPS 2026

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只收录了一个版本。收录下一版后,可以对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-13 16:51 · 最新观测版本

Adversarially Attacking Symbolic Vocabulary Vulnerabilities In LLM Planners

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, their abilities in navigating automated planning tasks have become essential. However, despite their strengths, LLMs' planning ability is not robust, particularly when they are not allowed to exploit commonsense cues in the symbolic vocabulary (e.g., names of actions, predicates, and objects) used to define planning tasks. This makes LLMs unreliable compared to symbolic planners. With recent reasoning models showing improved planning performance on tasks with obfuscated symbolic vocabularies, we utilize an adversarial attack framework to reveal to what extent the crucial weaknesses of LLM agents at joint symbolic interpretation and planning remain and whether they can reason properly when presented with severe cases. As such, our main contribution is devising an LLM-based attack model, which we call Symbolic Swapper, to automatically generate obfuscated planning domains with non-standard symbolic vocabularies that systematically break strong reasoning models' ability to plan. In doing so, we reveal how much LLMs' planning abilities can be further degraded under more advanced obfuscation schemes, allowing us to ascertain their success when having to rely on their pure planning ability. We find that attacks can decrease the planning performance of base models and even robust planning frameworks by over 70%. We further analyze the factors behind how LLM planning abilities break down and find that successful obfuscation causes models to appear to significantly degrade in reasoning quality despite them showing some inherent ability to understand the domain, revealing a gap in the perception of a task domain and being able to plan under it.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗