跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.17980 · v1

Algorithmic Opacity as a Principal-Agent Problem

首次提交 2026-11-13 18:08
版本更新 2026-11-13 18:08
雷达观测 2026-11-16 11:42
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Concerns about gaming and trade secrecy, frequently invoked to justify algorithmic opacity, can also mask self-serving strategic behavior by decision-makers, who may prioritize private benefits over social welfare. We develop a principal-agent test for when algorithmic decision-making should trigger disclosure obligations even when concerns about gaming or trade secrecy exist. The test, which is anchored in decision quality, relies on two diagnostics that can be disclosed without enabling gaming or revealing trade secrets: the error profile (false positive and false negative rates, overall and for each group) and the distribution of decision outcomes across groups. These diagnostics make visible whether decision-makers align design and implementation with the public interest or instead use opacity to obscure bias, inefficiency, or strategic shirking. Strong disparities across social groups, and asymmetries in the distribution of decision errors across outcome types, should trigger rebuttable presumptions favoring further disclosure. Where ground-truth error rates are unavailable, outcome distributions across groups can support the same presumption, and a decision-maker's inability to produce an error profile is itself diagnostic. The test thus treats fairness metrics as triggers for further disclosure and extends to generative and agentic systems through analogous metrics. The framework informs differentiated disclosure regimes (staged, partial, mediated, or audience-segmented). Once such regimes are considered, the domain of justifiable algorithmic opacity is significantly narrower than commonly assumed: when gaming or trade secrecy risks are legitimate, actionable disclosures (such as training data characteristics and key system design parameters) ordinarily can be mandated without compromising innovation or enabling gaming, even for technically inscrutable algorithms.

作者备注:76 pages, 1 table

期刊信息:N.Y.U. Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law 15(2) (2026) 1-76

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只收录了一个版本。收录下一版后,可以对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-13 18:08 · 最新观测版本

Algorithmic Opacity as a Principal-Agent Problem

Concerns about gaming and trade secrecy, frequently invoked to justify algorithmic opacity, can also mask self-serving strategic behavior by decision-makers, who may prioritize private benefits over social welfare. We develop a principal-agent test for when algorithmic decision-making should trigger disclosure obligations even when concerns about gaming or trade secrecy exist. The test, which is anchored in decision quality, relies on two diagnostics that can be disclosed without enabling gaming or revealing trade secrets: the error profile (false positive and false negative rates, overall and for each group) and the distribution of decision outcomes across groups. These diagnostics make visible whether decision-makers align design and implementation with the public interest or instead use opacity to obscure bias, inefficiency, or strategic shirking. Strong disparities across social groups, and asymmetries in the distribution of decision errors across outcome types, should trigger rebuttable presumptions favoring further disclosure. Where ground-truth error rates are unavailable, outcome distributions across groups can support the same presumption, and a decision-maker's inability to produce an error profile is itself diagnostic. The test thus treats fairness metrics as triggers for further disclosure and extends to generative and agentic systems through analogous metrics. The framework informs differentiated disclosure regimes (staged, partial, mediated, or audience-segmented). Once such regimes are considered, the domain of justifiable algorithmic opacity is significantly narrower than commonly assumed: when gaming or trade secrecy risks are legitimate, actionable disclosures (such as training data characteristics and key system design parameters) ordinarily can be mandated without compromising innovation or enabling gaming, even for technically inscrutable algorithms.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗