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arXiv:2611.21222 · v1

Verifiable Random Sampling of Private Data Without a Trusted Single Party

首次提交 2026-11-16 23:09
版本更新 2026-11-16 23:09
雷达观测 2026-11-17 16:10
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摘要

Problem: When a party supports claims about a private dataset by disclosing a sample, auditors cannot tell whether it was drawn at random or "cherry-picked" to hide flaws in the rest of the data. Solution: The data holder commits to the hashes of every item in its dataset and registers the commitment with independent servers. Selection then waits on a decentralized randomness beacon: a network that jointly emits a fresh random value every few seconds, outside the control of the data holder and the auditors. The value emitted two beacon rounds after the commitment picks the sample. Each server returns a signed receipt, so anyone can later check that the revealed sample is exactly the one that value prescribes. Selection from the committed set stays unbiased as long as the beacon's threshold holds and one required server is honest, and a pre-agreed name, checked with the servers, stops repeated or abandoned draws. We call this protocol NoCherry. Applications: Any audit that spot-checks a private corpus: private AI benchmarks and held-out test sets, dataset quality claims, code and security audits, test-fairness review, vulnerability handling, and compliance sampling. Auditors need not trust the data holder to hand over a representative sample of the committed data, since the protocol proves it, and data holders need not expose their entire dataset.

作者备注:12 pages

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v1 · 2026-11-16 23:09 · 最新观测版本

Verifiable Random Sampling of Private Data Without a Trusted Single Party

Problem: When a party supports claims about a private dataset by disclosing a sample, auditors cannot tell whether it was drawn at random or "cherry-picked" to hide flaws in the rest of the data. Solution: The data holder commits to the hashes of every item in its dataset and registers the commitment with independent servers. Selection then waits on a decentralized randomness beacon: a network that jointly emits a fresh random value every few seconds, outside the control of the data holder and the auditors. The value emitted two beacon rounds after the commitment picks the sample. Each server returns a signed receipt, so anyone can later check that the revealed sample is exactly the one that value prescribes. Selection from the committed set stays unbiased as long as the beacon's threshold holds and one required server is honest, and a pre-agreed name, checked with the servers, stops repeated or abandoned draws. We call this protocol NoCherry. Applications: Any audit that spot-checks a private corpus: private AI benchmarks and held-out test sets, dataset quality claims, code and security audits, test-fairness review, vulnerability handling, and compliance sampling. Auditors need not trust the data holder to hand over a representative sample of the committed data, since the protocol proves it, and data holders need not expose their entire dataset.

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