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arXiv:2611.21803 · v1

Mechanism Design and Active Systems Theory: 60 Years of Parallel Development

首次提交 2026-11-17 03:18
版本更新 2026-11-17 03:18
雷达观测 2026-11-18 19:44
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摘要

The survey compares two research traditions within the mathematical theory of designing the rules of interaction (mechanisms) for purposeful participants: mechanism design, together with contract theory and implementation theory, and the theory of active systems created by V.N. Burkov and developed into the theory of control in organizations (TCO) by D.A. Novikov's school; the main results of Yu.B. Germeier's school and of the domestic schools adjacent to active systems theory (AST) are covered as well. The problem statements and principal results of 2006-2026 are presented: for mechanism design (MD) - robust and dynamic mechanism design, multidimensional screening, information design, simplicity of mechanisms and credibility of the designer, market design, algorithmic and learning-based design, mechanisms for AI agents, and robust, relational, dynamic and algorithmic contracts; for AST and TCO - a general typology of control, strategy-proof and incentive-compatible planning mechanisms, decomposition of the agents' game, systems with distributed control and coalitional interaction, reflexive games and informational control, control of staff and structure, dynamic active systems, and project management. A correspondence between the classical results is established (the fair play principle and the revelation principle, the serial resource allocation mechanism and the uniform rule, active expertise mechanisms and generalized median schemes, quasi-compensatory incentive schemes and contracts under observable actions), and priorities are delineated by uniform rules; the areas where the two traditions diverge are identified, as are the dimensions of the problem (staff, structure, institutions, awareness, agents' beliefs) covered only by TCO.

作者备注:ISBN 978-5-91450-292-5. Text: electronic

期刊信息:Moscow: ICS RAS, 2026. - 132 p

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v1 · 2026-11-17 03:18 · 最新观测版本

Mechanism Design and Active Systems Theory: 60 Years of Parallel Development

The survey compares two research traditions within the mathematical theory of designing the rules of interaction (mechanisms) for purposeful participants: mechanism design, together with contract theory and implementation theory, and the theory of active systems created by V.N. Burkov and developed into the theory of control in organizations (TCO) by D.A. Novikov's school; the main results of Yu.B. Germeier's school and of the domestic schools adjacent to active systems theory (AST) are covered as well. The problem statements and principal results of 2006-2026 are presented: for mechanism design (MD) - robust and dynamic mechanism design, multidimensional screening, information design, simplicity of mechanisms and credibility of the designer, market design, algorithmic and learning-based design, mechanisms for AI agents, and robust, relational, dynamic and algorithmic contracts; for AST and TCO - a general typology of control, strategy-proof and incentive-compatible planning mechanisms, decomposition of the agents' game, systems with distributed control and coalitional interaction, reflexive games and informational control, control of staff and structure, dynamic active systems, and project management. A correspondence between the classical results is established (the fair play principle and the revelation principle, the serial resource allocation mechanism and the uniform rule, active expertise mechanisms and generalized median schemes, quasi-compensatory incentive schemes and contracts under observable actions), and priorities are delineated by uniform rules; the areas where the two traditions diverge are identified, as are the dimensions of the problem (staff, structure, institutions, awareness, agents' beliefs) covered only by TCO.

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