← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.21832 · v1
Auditors Struggle to Catch Sabotage In End-to-End Transcripts of AI Safety Research
首次提交 2026-11-17 03:52
版本更新 2026-11-17 03:52
雷达观测 2026-11-18 19:44
摘要
As AI systems are increasingly used to automate AI R&D, misaligned systems could sabotage research intended to improve model safety and alignment. To stress-test defenses against such sabotage, we use a human expert as a proxy saboteur on AI safety research. We conduct a red-team/blue-team game where a human researcher runs AI safety experiments from scratch and auditors try to tell which were sabotaged and how. Given access to the full research transcript and the ability to run experiments, human auditors mostly fail to distinguish sabotaged from benign research: they achieve an AUROC of 0.59, not significantly better than chance, and fully identify the specific sabotage in only 17% of cases. Despite not being allowed to run experiments, the best frontier models outperform human auditors (Fable 5.1: AUROC 0.73, 32% full identification) within noise and weaker models perform comparably. When the saboteur chooses which experiments are attacked, rather than being required to sabotage every question given, sabotage identification drops further. Our results suggest that research sabotage by expert-level agents is difficult to detect with current auditing methods and provide a new setting for studying research sabotage.
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v1 · 2026-11-17 03:52 · 最新观测版本
Auditors Struggle to Catch Sabotage In End-to-End Transcripts of AI Safety Research
As AI systems are increasingly used to automate AI R&D, misaligned systems could sabotage research intended to improve model safety and alignment. To stress-test defenses against such sabotage, we use a human expert as a proxy saboteur on AI safety research. We conduct a red-team/blue-team game where a human researcher runs AI safety experiments from scratch and auditors try to tell which were sabotaged and how. Given access to the full research transcript and the ability to run experiments, human auditors mostly fail to distinguish sabotaged from benign research: they achieve an AUROC of 0.59, not significantly better than chance, and fully identify the specific sabotage in only 17% of cases. Despite not being allowed to run experiments, the best frontier models outperform human auditors (Fable 5.1: AUROC 0.73, 32% full identification) within noise and weaker models perform comparably. When the saboteur chooses which experiments are attacked, rather than being required to sabotage every question given, sabotage identification drops further. Our results suggest that research sabotage by expert-level agents is difficult to detect with current auditing methods and provide a new setting for studying research sabotage.
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