← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.23350 · v2
Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking
首次提交 2026-11-17 20:04
版本更新 2026-11-19 10:41
雷达观测 2026-11-20 10:50
摘要
Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.
作者备注:29 pages, 14 figures, 20 tables. v2 adds an appendix and two reference hardware designs
观测到的版本
相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。
v2 · 2026-11-19 10:41 · 最新观测版本
Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking
Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.
查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗v1 · 2026-11-17 20:04
Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking
Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.
查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗