跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail
正在查看已观测的 v1。查看最新 v2 →

arXiv:2611.23350 · v1

Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking

首次提交 2026-11-17 20:04
版本更新 2026-11-17 20:04
雷达观测 2026-11-19 19:08
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.

作者备注:10 pages, 4 figures, 5 tables

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

仅对比实际观测的元数据,不代表 PDF 正文或实验变化。版本可能不连续;带删除线为移除,下划线为新增。

作者备注变化

1029 pages, 414 figures, 520 tables. v2 adds an appendix and two reference hardware designs

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v2 · 2026-11-19 10:41 · 最新观测版本

Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking

Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗
v1 · 2026-11-17 20:04

Asymmetric Optical Image Watermarking

Watermark detectors held by a provider cannot be checked by third parties, and a party that can detect a mark can usually also forge it. We study a two-layer image watermark in which the Fourier transform at the core of the pipeline is performed by a coherent optical 4F unit. Layer 1 carries an Ed25519 signature bound to the image content in Fourier magnitudes, so anyone with the public key verifies offline. Layer 2 is a key-defined carrier written by a secret phase hologram and read by a matched-filter correlator. The optics is a scalar-diffraction simulation with finite modulator bits, pixel aperture, pupil, defocus, misalignment, and sensor noise. No hardware is built. All criteria were fixed in a hashed specification before any optical result. The simulated optical signer reproduces the digital pipeline (field error 1.7e-15, bit agreement 99.997%), verifies at least 99.5% of 877 images under each of 8 post-sensor settings, one unattacked, and accepts none of 40,670 unmarked images. The optical carrier is key-selective: the matched key detects it on 99.8% of the unattacked images, and detection falls to 0% under a scale error of 1% and to 0% under a mask shift of 1 bin. Security rests on the signature and the content binding, for which we separate what is provable from what is measured.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗