跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.23614 · v1

Expanding and Evaluating the Applicability of Safe Pareto Improvements

首次提交 2026-11-18 07:07
版本更新 2026-11-18 07:07
雷达观测 2026-11-19 19:08
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Even when players can make credible joint commitments in games, disagreement about the game's default outcome (e.g., about equilibrium selection) can prevent them from agreeing on any particular payoff profile. We study safe Pareto improvements (SPIs): commitments that sidestep this obstacle by inducing a new game that is isomorphic to the original (after iteratively removing strictly dominated actions) but entrywise Pareto better. We do so by constructing token games: cheap-talk games rendered meaningful by commitments to take payoff-relevant actions (in prior work, strategies in the original game) as a function of the token outcome. Since these token games preserve the original game's strategic structure, players should expect them to be played isomorphically and hence agree that they Pareto improve on the original. In this work, we study token game SPIs under three additional commitment abilities: (1) burning utility, (2) transferring utility between players, and (3) transferring utility with an outside party conditional on the token outcome (e.g., via insurance-like contracts). We characterize when SPIs exist in each case and give efficient algorithms for optimizing over them. Finally, we propose evaluating SPI frameworks by how often they enable SPIs in randomly generated games. In such experiments, our methods substantially outperform prior work.

作者备注:An earlier version was presented at GAIW'26

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只收录了一个版本。收录下一版后,可以对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-18 07:07 · 最新观测版本

Expanding and Evaluating the Applicability of Safe Pareto Improvements

Even when players can make credible joint commitments in games, disagreement about the game's default outcome (e.g., about equilibrium selection) can prevent them from agreeing on any particular payoff profile. We study safe Pareto improvements (SPIs): commitments that sidestep this obstacle by inducing a new game that is isomorphic to the original (after iteratively removing strictly dominated actions) but entrywise Pareto better. We do so by constructing token games: cheap-talk games rendered meaningful by commitments to take payoff-relevant actions (in prior work, strategies in the original game) as a function of the token outcome. Since these token games preserve the original game's strategic structure, players should expect them to be played isomorphically and hence agree that they Pareto improve on the original. In this work, we study token game SPIs under three additional commitment abilities: (1) burning utility, (2) transferring utility between players, and (3) transferring utility with an outside party conditional on the token outcome (e.g., via insurance-like contracts). We characterize when SPIs exist in each case and give efficient algorithms for optimizing over them. Finally, we propose evaluating SPI frameworks by how often they enable SPIs in randomly generated games. In such experiments, our methods substantially outperform prior work.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗