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arXiv:2611.24276 · v1

When Shuffling Fails: Token Recovery from Obfuscated KV Caches

首次提交 2026-11-18 19:53
版本更新 2026-11-18 19:53
雷达观测 2026-11-19 15:04
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摘要

LLM serving systems store, offload, and share KV caches, exposing token-level representations to infrastructure operators and co-tenants. Shuffled obfuscation combines secret linear transforms with fresh permutations, claiming security from b! possible shufflings. We show that input symmetry invalidates this counting argument: security depends on distinguishable outputs under chosen inputs. Repeated tokens produce identical first-layer Value rows, making every row permutation leave the data unchanged. Only auxiliary structures such as a single-row recovery marker vary, reducing the effective state space from b! to b. We construct Repeat-to-Reveal. The attacker collects the b distinguishable states from its own probes and exploits their rank-one differences to recover an equivalent denoiser without knowing the defender's secret parameters. A one-time calibration transfers across requests sharing the same secret epoch, enabling passive token-multiset recovery from subsequently observed cache blocks through public-model dictionary matching. We instantiate the attack on official KV-Cloak and evaluate 3,000 real WildChat user prompts across nine models and eleven configurations. The attack recovers the secret parameters with high accuracy and achieves 100 percent token-multiset recovery on GPU. Refreshing row-level secrets between epochs interrupts cross-request transfer, confirming secret reuse scope as the operative vulnerability. We further confirm orbit collapse on two other open-source defenses: the sequence-permutation implementation of Thomas et al. and PermLLM. The KV-Cloak developers invited a detailed report through their private vulnerability reporting channel.

作者备注:18 pages, 8 figures, 4 tables

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v1 · 2026-11-18 19:53 · 最新观测版本

When Shuffling Fails: Token Recovery from Obfuscated KV Caches

LLM serving systems store, offload, and share KV caches, exposing token-level representations to infrastructure operators and co-tenants. Shuffled obfuscation combines secret linear transforms with fresh permutations, claiming security from b! possible shufflings. We show that input symmetry invalidates this counting argument: security depends on distinguishable outputs under chosen inputs. Repeated tokens produce identical first-layer Value rows, making every row permutation leave the data unchanged. Only auxiliary structures such as a single-row recovery marker vary, reducing the effective state space from b! to b. We construct Repeat-to-Reveal. The attacker collects the b distinguishable states from its own probes and exploits their rank-one differences to recover an equivalent denoiser without knowing the defender's secret parameters. A one-time calibration transfers across requests sharing the same secret epoch, enabling passive token-multiset recovery from subsequently observed cache blocks through public-model dictionary matching. We instantiate the attack on official KV-Cloak and evaluate 3,000 real WildChat user prompts across nine models and eleven configurations. The attack recovers the secret parameters with high accuracy and achieves 100 percent token-multiset recovery on GPU. Refreshing row-level secrets between epochs interrupts cross-request transfer, confirming secret reuse scope as the operative vulnerability. We further confirm orbit collapse on two other open-source defenses: the sequence-permutation implementation of Thomas et al. and PermLLM. The KV-Cloak developers invited a detailed report through their private vulnerability reporting channel.

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