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arXiv:2611.25394 · v1

Behavioral Containment: Source-to-Binary Function Matching for 1-Day Vulnerability Detection

首次提交 2026-11-19 10:36
版本更新 2026-11-19 10:36
雷达观测 2026-11-20 10:50
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摘要

Vulnerabilities in reused open-source code often propagate into deployed binaries. Detecting them requires source-to-binary function matching, which locates the affected source function in a binary. Applying prior binary-to-binary approaches to this task would require compiling the source code with the same build configuration as the target binary, which is usually unavailable. Decompiling the binary does not make prior source-to-source approaches work either, because decompiled code differs substantially from the original source code. We observe that compilation transforms the code of a function but largely preserves its behavior. A binary function that implements a source function therefore contains its behavior, a property we call behavioral containment. Building on this, we present SBIND, which decompiles the binary and checks behavioral containment instead of comparing code. SBIND represents each function by behavioral paths, sequences of normalized operations from its entry to its exits, and aligns source paths with binary paths in order. To detect 1-day vulnerabilities, SBIND compares the binary with the vulnerable and the patched source only on the paths through the changed lines. On stripped binaries built with two compilers, two optimization levels, and four architectures, SBIND ranks the correct function first in 77.87% of 32,008 searches, against 45.69% for the state-of-the-art approach SBridge. On 26 1-day CVEs, SBIND reaches an F1 score of 0.70 on stripped binaries, against 0.51 for SBridge. Our replication of SBridge also revealed several issues in its implementation and evaluation, and its authors have acknowledged them.

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v1 · 2026-11-19 10:36 · 最新观测版本

Behavioral Containment: Source-to-Binary Function Matching for 1-Day Vulnerability Detection

Vulnerabilities in reused open-source code often propagate into deployed binaries. Detecting them requires source-to-binary function matching, which locates the affected source function in a binary. Applying prior binary-to-binary approaches to this task would require compiling the source code with the same build configuration as the target binary, which is usually unavailable. Decompiling the binary does not make prior source-to-source approaches work either, because decompiled code differs substantially from the original source code. We observe that compilation transforms the code of a function but largely preserves its behavior. A binary function that implements a source function therefore contains its behavior, a property we call behavioral containment. Building on this, we present SBIND, which decompiles the binary and checks behavioral containment instead of comparing code. SBIND represents each function by behavioral paths, sequences of normalized operations from its entry to its exits, and aligns source paths with binary paths in order. To detect 1-day vulnerabilities, SBIND compares the binary with the vulnerable and the patched source only on the paths through the changed lines. On stripped binaries built with two compilers, two optimization levels, and four architectures, SBIND ranks the correct function first in 77.87% of 32,008 searches, against 45.69% for the state-of-the-art approach SBridge. On 26 1-day CVEs, SBIND reaches an F1 score of 0.70 on stripped binaries, against 0.51 for SBridge. Our replication of SBridge also revealed several issues in its implementation and evaluation, and its authors have acknowledged them.

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