跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail
← 研踪 PaperTrail

arXiv:2611.25709 · v1

Distortion in Online Voting

首次提交 2026-11-19 16:21
版本更新 2026-11-19 16:21
雷达观测 2026-11-20 19:58
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

We initiate the study of distortion in online voting, a framework that bridges computational social choice and online algorithms. In contrast to the classical offline setting, where the full election instance is known in advance, we consider a dynamic environment where a fixed set of voters is present from the beginning, but alternatives arrive sequentially over time. Upon each arrival, a mechanism must immediately and irrevocably decide whether to retain the currently selected candidate or switch to the newly arriving one, operating solely on the partial ordinal rankings induced by the underlying cardinal preferences. We provide upper and lower bounds for deterministic and randomized mechanisms under two standard cardinal preference frameworks. Utilitarian framework: For deterministic mechanisms under adversarial arrival order, we establish an Ω(mn)Ω(mn) lower bound and give an matching online algorithm with distortion at most 23m(n+14)\frac{2}{3}m(n+\frac{1}{4}). For randomized rules, we introduce regularity, which allows any regular, order-independent offline randomized rule to be converted into an online rule with the same expected distortion. The Harmonic voting rule satisfies this property, yielding online distortion O(mlog⁡m)O(\sqrt{m\log m}). Metric framework: For deterministic mechanisms, maintaining an alternative within a φ\varphi-weighted uncovered set guarantees distortion 2+52+\sqrt{5}. We show that matching-based offline rules achieving distortion 33 cannot be directly implemented online. We establish a lower bound of 13\sqrt{13}, even with three alternatives, and a matching upper bound for three alternatives and any number of voters. For randomized mechanisms, regularity gives an online distortion of 3−2n3-\frac{2}{n} via Random Dictatorship.

AI 论文解读

基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

此版本尚未生成 AI 解读。解读由后台任务生成并按论文版本保存,登录后共享已有结果。

版本差异

目前只收录了一个版本。收录下一版后,可以对照标题、作者、分类和摘要。

观测到的版本

相邻记录可能跳过中间版本;首次发现 v2 及以上也会标为版本更新。

v1 · 2026-11-19 16:21 · 最新观测版本

Distortion in Online Voting

We initiate the study of distortion in online voting, a framework that bridges computational social choice and online algorithms. In contrast to the classical offline setting, where the full election instance is known in advance, we consider a dynamic environment where a fixed set of voters is present from the beginning, but alternatives arrive sequentially over time. Upon each arrival, a mechanism must immediately and irrevocably decide whether to retain the currently selected candidate or switch to the newly arriving one, operating solely on the partial ordinal rankings induced by the underlying cardinal preferences. We provide upper and lower bounds for deterministic and randomized mechanisms under two standard cardinal preference frameworks. Utilitarian framework: For deterministic mechanisms under adversarial arrival order, we establish an Ω(mn)Ω(mn) lower bound and give an matching online algorithm with distortion at most 23m(n+14)\frac{2}{3}m(n+\frac{1}{4}). For randomized rules, we introduce regularity, which allows any regular, order-independent offline randomized rule to be converted into an online rule with the same expected distortion. The Harmonic voting rule satisfies this property, yielding online distortion O(mlog⁡m)O(\sqrt{m\log m}). Metric framework: For deterministic mechanisms, maintaining an alternative within a φ\varphi-weighted uncovered set guarantees distortion 2+52+\sqrt{5}. We show that matching-based offline rules achieving distortion 33 cannot be directly implemented online. We establish a lower bound of 13\sqrt{13}, even with three alternatives, and a matching upper bound for three alternatives and any number of voters. For randomized mechanisms, regularity gives an online distortion of 3−2n3-\frac{2}{n} via Random Dictatorship.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗