Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building
Mengqian Zhang, Sen Yang, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang
原文摘要
Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition, reduces blockspace efficiency, and obscures MEV flow transparency. To improve equitability and economic efficiency in block building, we propose $\textsf{Boost+}$, a system that pools submitted order flows inside an attested execution environment and gives all participating block-building algorithms equal access to them. The core of $\textsf{Boost+}$ is the mechanism $M_{\textsf{Boost+}}$, built around a baseline block-building algorithm. $M_{\textsf{Boost+}}$ aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders: Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders. For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the baseline algorithm dominates competing builders, and it remains dominant for all conflict-free transactions, even when builders may win. We further show that even if a searcher can technically integrate with a builder, non-integration combined with truthful bidding still dominates any deviation for conflict-free transactions. We also implement a concrete baseline algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions and evaluate its efficacy using historical data.
cs.CR