让下一篇重要论文，不再错过。

原文摘要

Package hallucinations, LLM-generated references to packages that do not exist, enable slopsquatting: an attacker registers the hallucinated name. We replicate Spracklen et al. (USENIX Security '25) on five 2026 frontier models over 199,840 Python and JavaScript generations. This version reports a preregistered live revalidation that replaces the static package lists of earlier versions with two independent checks against the live PyPI and npm registries. Hallucination rates are 3.6-5.0% of package mentions (2.2-3.4% of generations): the 2026 frontier sits at the level of 2024's commercial models, and the open-weight gap seen in 2024 has disappeared. Python exceeds JavaScript for every model. The set of names hallucinated by all five models shrinks from the 127 reported earlier to 104; 26 earlier entries were correct import statements whose module name differs from the package name. Using the accidental six-month public exposure of our own list as a natural experiment, we find no detectable effect of publication: about 1% of hallucinated names were registered within six months, at the same rate for published and unpublished names, and the 95% interval excludes increases above 2.5 percentage points. Still, at least 23 package names that the models suggest had previously hosted malware later removed by the registries, and one hallucinated name was registered with malware after our runs.