Diverse Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting
Julian Chingoma, Davide Grossi, Feline Lindeboom, Jan Maly
The study of approval-based committee voting has so far focused predominantly on proportional representation. The canonical notion of diverse representation, based on the Chamberlin-Courant score, counts the number of voters with at least one representative in the committee, making it an individualistic notion. We develop a more comprehensive theory that instead requires the representation of many groups of voters, grounding it in the justified representation (JR) axiom, which we strengthen in two directions. First, we study the existing axioms of Strong JR (SJR) and Semi-Strong JR (SSJR), which consider the same cohesive groups as JR but demand stricter representation. We show that neither can be optimized efficiently on general domains (unless P = NP), but both can be on the Candidate Interval and Voter Interval domain. Second, to capture the unique and defining opinions of a group, we introduce Distinctive Representation (DR) and its local optimization variant, Local DR. We address satisfiability and computation time, and show (Local) DR to be distinct from known proportionality and diversity axioms. Experiments on real-world and synthetic data show that Local DR performs well on multiple empirical measures of diversity.
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