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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.12434

Frontier AI Safety and Governance 2026: Risk Understanding and Coordinated Governance

Zeng Yi, Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Cao Gongce, Lu Enmeng, Chen Yu, Han Kaiyu, Li Kai, Wang Zhengqi 等 110 位作者

原文摘要

Frontier AI Safety and Governance 2026: Risk Understanding and Coordinated Governance is a key outcome of the AI Safety and Governance Program of World Internet Conference Specialized Committee on AI in 2026. Drawing on the latest developments in frontier AI capabilities and applications, the report systematically examines the evolving risk landscape, analyzing key risk areas, their severity and response priorities. Building on a review of existing global governance practices and an assessment of frontier AI governance readiness, it identifies key governance gaps and weaknesses and proposes directions and practical mechanisms for coordinated responses. The report provides a reference for government departments, international organizations, businesses, research institutions and other stakeholders. It aims to strengthen the international community's understanding of and consensus on frontier AI risks, enhance preparedness and collective response capacity, and advance the safe, reliable and responsible development of frontier AI to better serve the common well-being of humanity.

cs.CY

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arXiv ↗PDF ↗
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.03319

TrafficInstruct: A Multi-Task Network Traffic Dataset and Benchmark for Instruction Tuning

Zhengdao Li, Hui Wen, Zixuan Wan, Weifeng Zhang, Yan Wu, Benlong Wu, Nenghai Yu, Weiming Zhang 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Instruction tuning for multi-task network traffic analysis requires data with clearly defined sources, supervision targets, and evaluation conditions. We introduce TrafficInstruct, a newly collected dataset comprising raw packet captures and 55,000 structured supervised fine-tuning records across ten tasks: malware traffic detection, botnet detection, malicious DNS-over-HTTPS detection, Web attack detection, advanced persistent threat detection, encrypted VPN detection, Tor behavior detection, encrypted application/service classification, website fingerprinting, and application classification under concept drift. An automated workflow captures traffic from controlled software executions, attack experiments, and application activities. Labels are supported by task-specific collection evidence, including process or socket attribution, activity records, and execution outcomes. Filtering, sanitization, and task-specific transformations produce instructions, traffic observations, and structured answers. We verify sample sources and partition the dataset by complete collection sessions, keeping all samples from the same session within one partition. The benchmark defines allowed inputs, deterministic label mappings, fixed training/validation/test partitions, and task-wise scoring rules. We evaluate majority-class, random-forest, and ET-BERT baselines, an unadapted 27B language model, and independently trained task-specific LoRA adapters on a shared frozen base. Adapters are selected using validation data and evaluated on the corresponding test sets. Task-specific adaptation improves classification performance, supporting instruction tuning across diverse traffic-analysis tasks.

cs.CR · cs.AI

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arXiv ↗PDF ↗
新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.02506

CellPlex: Benchmarking Single-Cell Spatial Proteomics Prediction from H&E

Zijun Gao, Yijiang Chen, Xiangde Luo, Pheng-Ann Heng

原文摘要

Spatial proteomics measures tens of proteins in every cell of a tissue section, but its cost confines it to small research cohorts, whereas hematoxylin and eosin (H\&E) slides exist for nearly every patient. Inferring single-cell spatial proteomics from H\&E would bring its analyses to routine pathology, and a growing number of virtual staining models pursue this goal. Each is evaluated on its own cohort, panel and pixel-level metric, and released models transfer poorly to new cohorts, leaving open which approach to build on and which proteins H\&E can reveal. We introduce CellPlex, a benchmark that poses the task at the level of the cell: seven cohorts with same-section H\&E and multiplexed immunofluorescence, from colorectal and breast cancer to lymph-node metastases, bone marrow and glioma, with 717 samples, 44.8 million cells and 149 proteins, processed by one pipeline into per-cell targets. Pathology foundation models (PFMs) are adapted with one cell-level protocol, specialist models are fine-tuned under a matched budget, and all are scored on the same cells. Adapted PFMs are the most accurate models on every cohort, ahead of the specialists even after fine-tuning, but keep less than half of their accuracy on cohorts they were not trained on. Which proteins can be predicted depends on the tissue, not on how many cells were measured for them. By fixing the cells, targets and splits on which predictions are judged, CellPlex sets a common standard for inferring costly molecular measurements from routine H\&E and shows how far H\&E can stand in for spatial proteomics. We will release the data, splits, evaluation code and baselines as a testbed for developing and comparing future pathology foundation models and virtual staining methods.

cs.CV

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arXiv ↗PDF ↗
版本更新 · v3arXiv:2608.04565

Breadcrumbing Search Agents: Per-Turn Scheming Over Long-Horizon Trajectories

Xuebin Li, Hanqing Zhao, Siyuan Liang, Kejiang Chen, Weiming Zhang, Dacheng Tao, Nenghai Yu

原文摘要

LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected. We show that the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary: beyond exposing the agent to a single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only one controlled result per query can substantially increase attack success when the evidence is coordinated across the agent's trajectory. We study this setting with a strategy-driven long-horizon attack system and introduce Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources. ACH achieves the highest Overall ASR among all baselines, reaching 55.9% / 83.3% ASR / MaxN ASR on the full SafeSearch test split. We further introduce Trace-Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), which automatically improves attacker strategies from execution traces, replacing manual redesign with trace-driven refinement; its strongest single setting reaches 71.4% / 95.0% in held-out evaluation. Code is available at https://github.com/MBOSSLESS/Breadcrumbing-Search-Agents.

cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.CL

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arXiv ↗PDF ↗
首次观测 · 记录 #1ACL Anthology · ACL 2026:acl:2026.acl-long.1139ACL Anthology · ACL 2026

Into the Gray Zone: Domain Contexts Can Blur LLM Safety Boundaries

Ki Sen Hung, Xi Yang Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Chang Liu University of Science and Technology of China, Haoran Li, Kejiang Chen University of Science and Technology of China, Changxuan Fan, Tsun On Kwok The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Weiming Zhang University of Science and Technology of China 等 10 位作者

原文摘要

A central goal of LLM alignment is to balance helpfulness with harmlessness, yet these objectives conflict when the same knowledge serves both legitimate and malicious purposes. This tension is amplified by context-sensitive alignment: we observe that domain-specific contexts (e.g., chemistry) selectively relax defenses for domain-relevant harmful knowledge, while safety-research contexts (e.g., jailbreak studies) trigger broader relaxation spanning all harm categories. To systematically exploit this vulnerability, we propose Jargon, a framework combining safety-research contexts with multi-turn adversarial interactions that achieves attack success rates exceeding 93% across seven frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5, and Gemini-3, substantially outperforming existing methods. Activation space analysis reveals that Jargon queries occupy an intermediate region between benign and harmful inputs, a gray zone where refusal decisions become unreliable. To mitigate this vulnerability, we design a policy-guided safeguard that steers models toward helpful yet harmless responses, and internalize this capability through alignment fine-tuning, reducing attack success rates while preserving helpfulness.

cs.CL

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · 2026 · 正式发表